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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
AARON L. HELBACH,
Appellant/Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 20080951-CA

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee/Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Petitioner appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief
challenging his conviction for aggravated robbery. This Court has jurisdiction of
this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the post-conviction court correctly conclude that Helbach failed to
demonstrate that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary?
2. Did the post-conviction court correctly conclude that Helbach failed to
demonstrate that the trial court should have sua sponte ordered a competency
examination before accepting the guilty plea?

3. Did the post-conviction court correctly conclude that Helbach failed to
establish that his trial attorney was ineffective for not requesting a competency
examination?
4. Did the post-conviction court correctly conclude that Helbach failed to
establish that his trial attorney was ineffective for not challenging the admissibility
of Helbach's confession?
Standard of Review. A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief has the
burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts
necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief. This Court reviews the post-conviction
court's legal conclusions for correctness and its factual findings for clear error.,
Matthews v. Galetka, 958 P.2d 949, 950 (Utah App. 1998) (citations omitted).
5. Did the post-conviction court err in not sua sponte ordering an evidentiary
hearing on Helbach's claims?
Standard of Review. Unpreserved claims are evaluated for plain error. See
State v. Richardson, 2009 UT App 40, Ifl 7-8, 204 P.3d 872 (claim that trial court
should have ordered evidentiary hearing reviewed for plain error where defendant
failed to request a hearing).

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutes are attached as Addendum A:
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-302 (West 2004);
Utah Code Annotated § 77-15-5 (West Supp. 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 21, 2003, Helbach was charged in Second District Court, Weber
County, with three counts of aggravated robbery in three separate informations. R.
383-84 ("Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Dismissing Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief/' dated September 26, 2009, Addendum B). In case no.
031901411, it was alleged that Helbach, claiming to have a gun, robbed an Arby's
restaurant on February 14, 2003. R. 384. In case no. 031901412, it was alleged that
Helbach, claiming to have a knife, robbed a Sinclair station on March 11,2003. Id.
Helbach was also charged in the Second Judicial District Court in Davis County
with two armed robberies of convenience stores that occurred on February 13,2003.
See docket for case no. 031700453. Id.
Helbach ultimately pleaded guilty to a total of three counts of aggravated
robbery. On April 7, 2003, Helbach pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated
robbery in the Davis County case and the other count of aggravated robbery in that
case was dismissed pursuant to a plea bargain. On August 18, 2003, Helbach
pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery in the Weber County cases. See

3

Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel ("Plea
Statement"), R. 44-49, Addendum C. In exchange for Helbach's guilty pleas to in the
Weber County cases (case nos. 031901411 and 031901412), the State agreed to
dismiss the third count (case no. 031901413) and to recommend that any prison term
be imposed concurrently with any term imposed in the Davis County case.1
In the Plea Statement in the Weber County cases, which are the subject of thus
appeal, Helbach acknowledges the elements of the crimes to which he pleaded
guilty: "I unlawfully and intentionally took or attempted to take personal property
from another by the threatened use of a gun." R. 45. He also stated:
I stipulate and agree that the following facts describe my
conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am
criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to
accept my guilty plea and prove the elements of the crime(s) to
which I am pleading guilty: On 2-14-2003 and 3-11-2003 I
attempted to take property from (1) Arby's and (2) D. Magoon
by use of a gun (1) and a knife (2).
Id.
He acknowledged that his guilty plea waives all of the constitutional rights to
which he would otherwise be entitled, including the presumption of innocence, the
privilege against self-incrimination and the rights to a jury trial, to confront and

The charges and guilty pleas are summarized in a Department of Corrections
Field Operations memorandum, dated August 27, 2003, R. 59-60, and in the Presentence Investigative Report ("PSIR"), dated May 14, 20004, R. 61-70.
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cross-examine witnesses and to appeal. R. 46. The Plea Statement advised Helbach
that he could receive a prison sentence of five years to life. R. 38.
Helbach stated:
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force,
threats, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to get me to
plead guilty. No promises except those contained in this statement
have been made to me . . . I have read this statement, or I have had it
read to me by an attorney, and I understand its contents and adopt
each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or
delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make
any changes because all of the statements are correct.
R. 41-42.
Helbach affirmed that he was mentally stable and able to comprehend the
plea agreement:
I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants
which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I
am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or
intoxicants which impair my judgment. I believe myself to be of sound
and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of understanding
these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any
mental disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from
understanding what I am doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily entering my plea.
R.42.
Finally, Helbach acknowledged that he understood that if he wished to
withdraw his plea, he could do so only by motion filed before sentencing and only
upon a showing of good cause. Id.

5

During the August 18, 2003, change-of-plea hearing in the Weber County
cases, the contents of the Plea Statement were properly incorporated into the record
through a colloquy with the trial court:
THE COURT: All right. Is there a written plea agreement?
MR. CAINE [defendant's counsel]: There is.
THE COURT: And you understand what's in there, Mr. Helbach?
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I do.
THE COURT: What's you level of education?
THE DEFENDANT: Post high school tech school.
THE COURT: And you read and write and understand well?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Are you on any medications, alcohol, drugs or do you have
any mental health condition today that would make it so you don'i fully
understanding what's happening?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: And are you satisfied with the legal representation
you've received?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: All right. If you wish, you may go ahead and sign that.
MR. CAINE: Actually, he signed it earlier, I can affirm. We'll just
make a record, Your Honor. Aaron, you and reviewed this document
and talked about this and it bears your signature and you just signed it
in the lockup in there a minute ago; is that correct?
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THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: That is your signature? And do you waive or give up
your preliminary hearing rights?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You understand you've had the right to have
preliminary hearings?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay.
R. 301-03 (Transcript, change-of-plea hearing, dated August 18, 2003) (emphasis
added), Addendum D.
On September 8, 2003, Helbach was sentenced to two terms of five years to
life at the Utah State Prison.

The court reluctantly followed the State's

recommendation and agreed to impose concurrent sentences for the two crimes:
THE COURT: Well, again, I struggle. You had four felonies as a
juvenile, and then you have the Davis County felony, and this makes
six felonies, and many of them [are] very, very serious felonies. I
suppose I can just place my trust in the Board of Pardons and hope
that they do what is right. And I suspect they're going to have an
opportunity to observe you and your conduct while you're at the
prison. So I'm going to go along with it I have a great deal of
reluctance because these are very serious charges.
R. 317 (Transcript, sentencing hearing, dated September 8, 2003), Addendum E.
Helbach filed no timely appeal.
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On March 5, 2004, Helbach filed a pleading in the Weber County criminal
cases captioned "Motion to be Re-Sentenced Nunc Pro Tunc" in which he claimed
inter alia that his plea was improperly and involuntarily entered due to mental
illness. In denying the motion, the trial court stated that:
Rule 11 governing pleas has been substantially complied with by the
Court and that Defendant was advised by this Court that if he had any
mental illness that affected his ability to understand[,] he should not go
ahead[,] and he stated that he understood that. Numerous other
questions were posed to Defendant which he answered in a manner
that indicated he fully understood what he was doing.
R. 321-22.
On August 9, 2004, Helbach filed a "Notice of Appeal." On November 2'.,
2004, this Court dismissed the appeal. See State v. Helbach, 2004 UT APP 388U
(Memorandum Decision) ("Helbach I"), cert, denied, 109 P.3d 804 (2005), Addendum
F.2 The court noted that Helbach's motion to be resentenced was "in substance" a
motion to withdraw his plea, which must be filed before sentencing. Id. at 7 (citing
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (motion to withdraw plea "shall be made by motion
before sentence is announced")). The Court held that because Helbach's motion to
withdraw his plea was filed months too late, the trial court had no jurisdiction to
consider it and the court of appeals had no jurisdiction over the appeal. Id. at 7-8.

2

For the Court's convenience, the State has numbered the paragraphs of the
unpublished decisions attached as addenda F, G & I.
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Helbach next attempted to challenge his convictions in the Weber County
cases by filing a petition for extraordinary relief in this Court under rule 19, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, which also sought habeas corpus relief under
appellate rule 20. R. 12-34. This Court denied that petition, explaining that rule 19
requires that "no plain, speedy or adequate remedy exists" and that Helbach had
such a remedy available under rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. R. 193-94
(Helbach v. Judge Roger Dutson, et al, 2004 UT App 480U (Memorandum Decision)
("Helbach II")), Addendum G. The appellate court also denied the petition under
Utah R. App. P. 20 because Helbach had stated no reason why the petition should
not be directed to the district court. Id. at 4. The court referred the petition to the
Second Judicial District Court to the extent that it raised issues for review under the
Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act ("PCRA"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-9-101 - 405
(West Supp. 2009), and rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 4-5.
In evaluating Helbach's claims under the PCRA, Second Judicial District
Court initially denied the requested relief and dismissed the petition in its entirety.
R. 197-204. However, the Court later reconsidered and agreed to allow some of
Helbach's claims to go forward. R. 208-223 (Ruling and Order, dated May 16,2006
("May 16 Order")), Addendum H.
On January 30, 2006, Helbach filed documents in the United States District
Court for the District of Utah purporting to state claims under 28 USCA § 2254.
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There, Helbach challenged the validity of his guilty pleas entered in the Weber
County cases. The federal court dismissed that petition on July 7, 2008.
Meanwhile, the Second Judicial Court, Davis County, dismissed claims
virtually identical to those raised in the instant matter. See Helbach v. State, 2007 UT
App 191U (Memorandum Decision), ('Helbach III"), Addendum I. In that case,
Helbach claimed that his plea was not knowing and voluntary, the trial court erred
in not sua sponte ordering a competency examination and ineffective assistance of
counsel. See id. Helbach appealed that dismissal and this Court affirmed. Helbach
III, 2007 UT App 191U at \ 7.
On October 6, 2008, the Second Judicial District Court, Weber County,
dismissed Helbach's post-conviction petition (the instant matter) challenging his
guilty plea in the Weber County cases. R. 383-95 ,Addendum B.
Helbach timely appealed. R. 398.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point LA, Helbach has failed to demonstrate his plea was not knowingly and
voluntarily entered. During post-conviction and now on appeal, Helbach has
argued that the trial court did not comply with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, in accepting the plea. However, a post-conviction petitioner is not
entitled to relief based on the trial court's violation of rule 11 unless he can show
that the violation rendered his plea unknowing and involuntary.

Helbach

demonstrated no rule 11 error, let alone any error that rendered the plea unknowing
and involuntary.
Point LB. Helbach has not demonstrated that he was entitled to a sua sponte
competency hearing. To show that he was entitled to a competency hearing, a
petitioner must show that there was a substantial question of possible doubt as to
his competency at the time tie entered his plea. Although Helbach presented
evidence showing that he may have suffered from some mental disorders at or near
the time he entered his plea, he presented no evidence showing that he was
incompetent or that there was a substantial question of possible doubt as to his
competency. The post-conviction court therefore properly denied relief based on
these claims.
Point II.A. Helbach failed to meet his burden to demonstrate that his trial
counsel was ineffective. Helbach claims he was incompetent and that his attorney

11

should have requested a competency evaluation, should not have recommended
acceptance of the guilty plea or should have moved to withdraw the plea when he
learned of Helbach7s mental health issues. However, mental illness does not
automatically render a defendant incompetent and Helbach failed to demonstrate
that he was incompetent. Because Helbach's apparent mental health issues did not
render him incompetent, his attorney had no reason to question the plea bargain.
Point II.B. Helbach claims his attorney was ineffective because he should
have moved to suppress his confession to police. This claim fails because Helbach7s
knowing and voluntary guilty plea waived any pre-plea constitutional violations.
Point III. Helbach is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing, first, because he
never requested one and, second, because he did not establish disputed material
facts that would have required a hearing.
Point IV. Any remaining claims are inadequately briefed.
ARGUMENT
I.
HELBACH HAS NOT PROVED HIS PLEA WAS UNKOWING
OR INVOLUNTARY.
A.

The Trial Court Properly Ensured Helbach's Plea was
Knowing and Voluntary,

Helbach claims his guilty plea was not a "voluntary, intelligent and knowing
admission of guilt with an understanding of the law in relation to the facts/' Aplt.
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Br. at 9. In support, Helbach alleges the trial court failed to comply with rule 11,
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. In post-conviction proceedings, however, Rule
11 violations alone are insufficient to invalidate a guilty plea.
On appeal, Helbach claims his plea was not knowing and voluntary because
inter alia the trial court did not advise him that:
• A sentence of "five years to life" means he could be in prison for
at least five years and perhaps for life, in violation of rule 11(e)(5),
Aplt. Br. at 11;
• He had until 30 days after his sentence to move to withdraw his
guilty plea, in violation of rule 11(e)(7), id. at 10,12;
• He had the right to appeal, in violation of rule 11(e)(8), e.g., id., at
22;
•The State had the burden of proving each element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of rule 11(e)(4)(A), id.
• Helbach also claimed that the court did not explain the
constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty (rule 11(e)(3)),
the elements of aggravated robbery or the factual basis for the plea
(rule 11(e)(4)(A) & (B)). E.g., id., at 9-11.
The post-conviction court ruled that Helbach's claims failed to the extent that
he alleged only technical violations of Rule 11, which did not demonstrate that his
plea was in fact involuntary. R. 386. This ruling is correct. Bluemel v. State, 2007 UT
90, ^ 18,173 P.3d 842; accord Salazar v. Warden, Utah State Prison, 852 P.2d 988 (Utah
1993).

"'[0]n collateral attack of a conviction, the petitioner must show a

constitutional violation to obtain relief/" Id. (citing Salazarf 852 P.2d at 991, n.6)

13

(emphasis added by Bluemel court). A plea is in fact knowing and voluntary if there
is a factual basis for the plea and the petitioner understands and waives his privilege
against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial and the right to confront
witnesses. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
The post-conviction court also ruled that even when Helbach's claims are
analyzed under the correct post-conviction review standards, they still do not
demonstrate that his plea was unknowing or involuntary. R. 387-88. This ruling is
also correct because Helbach's claims are flatly contradicted by the record. In the
Plea Statement, Helbach affirms that:
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force,
threats, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to get me to
plead guilty. No promises except those contained in this statement
have been made to me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by an
attorney, and I understand its contents and adopt each statement in it
as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete anything
contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes
because all of the statements are correct.
R. 290-91.
Helbach also affirmed during the change-of-plea hearing that he understood
and accepted the plea agreement and that he did so knowingly and voluntarily:
THE COURT: And you understand what's in there [the Plea
Statement], Mr. Helbach?
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THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I do.
THE COURT: What's you level of education?
THE DEFENDANT: Post high school tech school.
THE COURT: And you read and write and understand well?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Are you on any medications, alcohol, drugs or do you
have any mental health condition today that would make it so you don't fully
understanding what's happening?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
R. 302.
Helbach's claims that he was not advised of the elements of aggravated
robbery or of how his conduct met those elements are also contradicted by the
record.

In Utah, "[a] person commits robbery if . . . [he] unlawfully and

intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in the possession of
another from his person . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1) (a) (West 2004). The
robbery is aggravated "if in the course of committing robbery, he . . . uses or
threatens to use a dangerous weapon/7 Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(1) (a) (West 2004),
which is "any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury;..." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(a) (West 2004).
In the Plea Statement, Helbach fully acknowledged the elements of the
aggravated robbery and the factual basis for the plea: "I unlawfully and
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intentionally took or attempted to take personal property from another by the
threatened use of a gun/ 7 R. 39. He also stated:
I stipulate and agree . . . that the following facts describe my
conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally
liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty . . .
pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading
guilty: On 2-14-2003 and 3-11-2003 I attempted to take property from
(1) Arby's and (2) D. Magoon by use of a gun (1) and a knife (2).
Id.
In addition, the trial court reviewed the elements in more detail during
the plea colloquy:
THE COURT:... [Ujnder the most recent case from the Court of
Appeals, we have to be very detailed on the elements. And I'll go over
those again which may be somewhat duplicating what's in this written
agreement but I want you to clearly understand what you're pleading
to, what the elements are, and so Fm going to go over them in some
detail. I'll ask, first on the case of February the 14th on case 1411, and
that's the Arby's case, what would the elements have been had you
gone to trial on that?
MS. BEATON [prosecutor]: Do you want to state them?
MR. CAINE: . . . This is a case, this is a situation wheie the
defendant went in there, he indicated he had a weapon and attempting
to get property, money in this case, and that's what happened.
THE COURT: Did he obtain property or just attempt to gain property
at Arby's?
MR. CAINE: Yeah. He obtained the property.
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THE COURT: Arby's[,] he got some money or property from them
threatening them with a weapon?
MR. CAINE: Money, yes.
THE COURT: All right. And on the 11 th of March, D. Magoon, what
are the — that says it was a knife.
MR. CAINE: . . . This is the —at a Sinclair gas station actually. The
individual was the person named there and there was a[n] indication that he
had a knife and there was money from there also.
THE COURT: And you got money then?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: All right. So those then would be the elementsf: T]hat
you did by use of force or fear[ — ]a knife, and then in the other case, a gun[ — ]
steal money from persons[, which] you had no legal right to have. And you
understand those are the elements?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
R. 304-05.
Helbach also claims he was not advised that, if he went to trial, the State had
the burden of proving every element of the crime. However, the Plea Statement
explicitly states: "At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each
element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt/' R. 40.
Helbach next complains that he was not advised of his right to appeal.
Because Helbach pleaded guilty, he explicitly waived his right to appeal. Id.; see also
State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah App.1988) ("[A] voluntary guilty plea is a
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waiver of the right to appeal all nonjurisdictional issues, including alleged pre-plea
constitutional violations").3 If Helbach wished to appeal, he would first have had to
timely move to withdraw his plea. See Grimmett v. State, 2007 UT ll^f 25,152 P.3d
306 (" Absent a timely-filed motion to withdraw a guilty plea, this court does not
have jurisdiction over a direct appeal to review the validity of the plea"). And he
was advised that if he wished to withdraw his plea, he must file a written motion
before sentencing. R. 42; see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (Utah 2004).
Helbach did not do so. Thus, he effectively had no appellate rights once he entered
his guilty plea.
In his appellate brief, Helbach claims that he should have been told that he
had 30 days after sentencing to move to withdraw his plea. Aplt. Br. at 15. He
claims that under State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 23, 996 P.2d 1065, "which was the
governing law at the time of my proceedings, I should have been afforded 30 days
after the time of sentencing to withdraw my plea." Id. (emphasis added by Helbach).
Helbach is incorrect. Utah Code Ann. 77-13-6(1)(b), which became effective May 5,
2003, states that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea "shall be made by motion before
sentence is announced." Thus, this provision was the governing law when Helbach

3

Petitioner could have timely challenged his sentence on appeal, but he did
not do so. Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61, f 37,122 P.3d 628.
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entered his guilty plea on August 18, 2003. Helbach was properly advised that he
must move to withdraw his plea before sentencing. He did not do so.4
Finally, Helbach claims r/the court did not explain that the minimum I would
serve was 5 years maximum of life ..." Aplt. Br. at 25. On the first page of the Plea
Statement— the same statement Helbach has repeatedly affirmed having read and
understood —Helbach acknowledged that "I am pleading guilty to the following
crimes:... 2 (cts) Ag. Robbery/7 which may be punished by "MlN/MAX AND/OR
MINIMUM MANDATORY" sentences of "5-life USP and [$]20,000 fine on each." R. 38.
Although expressed in abbreviated form, the language "5-life USP" clearly means
that Helbach was pleading guilty to crimes that would result in a sentence at the
Utah State Prison for a minimum of five years and up to life. Helbach understood
this when he entered his guilty plea and it is absurd to suggest otherwise.
In sum, the post-conviction court correctly ruled that Helbachs' plea was
knowingly and voluntarily entered. The Plea Statement and the trial court's
colloquy with the defendant during the change-of-plea hearing clearly demonstrate
that Helbach's plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. Helbach has presented
nothing to suggest otherwise.

4

Nor did Helbach move to withdraw his plea within 30 days of sentencing.

19

B.

Helbach's Claim that the Trial Court Should Have
Ordered a Competency Hearing Fails Because Nothing
in the Record Raises a "Substantial Question Of
Possible Doubt" Concerning His Competence.

Helbach claims that the post-conviction court "committed error in denying
relief on [his] claim that he was incompetent to plead guilty [and] that he was
entitled to a competency hearing/' Appellant's Br. at 5. This claim is without merit.
"A mentally incompetent defendant can provide no defense, and proceedings
against such a defendant do not comport with due process/' State v. Young, 780 P.2d
1233,1236 (Utah 1989) (citing Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402,402 (I960)); see also
Jacobs v. State, 2001 UT 17, 1f 12, 20 P.3d 382, The same standard applies to a
determination of competency to stand trial and competency to plead guilty. Jacobs,
2001 UT 17, % 15 n.3.
"In determining whether a defendant is competent to [stand trial or] plead
guilty, the trial court must consider whether the defendant has sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding and has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him/7 State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Jacobs, 2001 UT 17, f 12; Utah Code
Ann. § 77-15-2. "In determining whether the trial court erred by not holding a
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competency hearing, a reviewing court considers the facts that were before the trial
court when the plea was entered/7 Helbach II, 2004 UT App 480U, f 1.
Competency to stand trial or to enter a guilty plea is, however, "a much
narrower concept than moral or social wellness, and thus the fact that a defendant is
twisted and disturbed does not necessarily mean he is unfit for trial'7 or unfit to
enter a guilty plea. Jacobs, 2001 UT 17, \ 16. "A defendant may be fit for trial even
though his mind is otherwise unsound/ 7 Id. This applies even though a person may
be diagnosed as "suffering] from personality disorders, depression, psychotic
episodes, and suicidal behaviors77 or "from chronic paranoid schizophrenia77 and
"diminished ability to control his behavior,77 and even where he may be diagnosed
as "actively psychotic.77 Id. at Tf^f 5, 7. "The fact that a person is mentally ill,
displays bizarre, volatile, and irrational behavior, or has a history of mental illness,
does not mean that he or she is incompetent to stand trial.77 Id. at \ 16.
In Utah, an order for a competency hearing "is mandatory only on the filing
of a petition77 to determine competency. State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281,285 (Utah 1985)
(citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5). Thus, a trial court "has no statutory duty to
order a hearing in the absence of a petition.77 Id. As a matter of constitutionallyguaranteed due process, however, "[a] trial court must hold a competency hearing
when there is a substantial question of possible doubt as to a defendant's
competency at the time of the guilty plea/7 Jacobs, 2001 UT 17, f 13 (internal
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quotation marks and citation omitted). In other words, the court must hold a
competency hearing when there is a substantial question of possible doubt as to
whether a defendant has "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding and has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him/7 Holland, 921 P.2d at 433 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Because a post-conviction petition is civil
in nature, "Helbach had the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that a substantial question of possible doubt as to his competency existed at the time
he pleaded guilty/7 Helbach 11, 2004 UT App 480U, % 2.
Accordingly, the issue for the post-conviction court was whether Helbach met
his burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence either that he was
incompetent to enter his plea or that "a substantial question of possible doubt" as to
his competency existed at the time he pled guilty. See Utah Code Annotated § 7735a-105 (West Supp. 2009) ("The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving
by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to
relief7).
In support of his claim that he was incompetent or that a competency hearing
was required, Helbach attached copies of a military evaluation of his mental health,
prepared on September 17, 2001, and a diagnostic evaluation, prepared June 18,
2003, for use in connection with his sentencing. See R. 68-70 (Entrance Physical
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Standards Board (EPSBD) Proceedings/' dated September 17, 2001 (hereinafter
"Military Evaluation")); R. 1 (Psychological Evaluation, dated June 18, 2003
("Psychological Evaluation).
In reviewing identical claims Helbach raised in his post-conviction challenge
to his conviction in the Davis County case, this Court found Helbach had
established neither his incompetence nor any reason to question the knowing and
voluntary nature of his guilty plea. See generally Helbach III, 2007 UT App 191U. In
that case, Helbach claimed he was incompetent when he entered his plea and that
his incompetence was established by his 2001 Military Evaluation and his 2003
Psychological Evaluation, prepared for use in sentencing. Id. at ^f 3. The postconviction court in the Davis County case rejected these claims and this Court
affirmed, holding that Helbach had not met his burden to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that a substantial question of possible doubt as to his competency
existed at the time he pleaded guilty. Helbach III, 2007 UT App 191 U, t 2. This
Court stated that Helbach
responded appropriately to the court's questions, affirmed his
understanding of the written plea agreement, and acknowledged that
he was knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty. . . . The postconviction court correctly determined that the facts before the district
court at the time of the change of plea did not give rise to a substantial
question of possible doubt about [Helbach's] competency.
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Id.5

Similarly, here, the post-conviction court ruled there was no evidence before
the trial court that would have raised a substantial question of possible doubt about
Helbach's competence to plead guilty. R. 390. The record shows that Helbach fully
participated in the change-of-plea hearing by responding coherently to the court's
questions, repeatedly affirming that he understood the contents of the Plea
Statement and acknowledging that he was knowingly and voluntarily pleading
guilty and waiving his constitutional rights:
THE COURT: All right. Is there a written plea agreement?
MR. CAINE [defendant's counsel]: There is.
THE COURT: And you understand what's in there, Mr. Helbach?
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I do.
THE COURT: What's you level of education?
THE DEFENDANT: Post high school tech school.
THE COURT: And you read and write and understand well?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

5

Although the Utah Supreme Court has held that res judicata does not in itself
bar relitigation of previously adjudicated issues or claims raised on post-conviction
petition, the court has stated that "a prior adjudication of the same ground for relief
is sufficient to bar relitigation on that ground, absent unusual circumstances." Hurst
v. Cook 777 P.2d 1029,1037 (Utah 1989).
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THE COURT: Are you on any medications, alcohol, drugs or do you have
any mental health condition today tlmt would make it so you don't fully
unde?'sta?zding wliat's liappening?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: And are you satisfied with the legal representation
you've received?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: All right. If you wish, you may go ahead and sign that.
MR. C AINE: Actually, he signed it earlier, I can affirm. We'll just make
a record, Your Honor. Aaron, you and reviewed this document and talked
about this and it bears your signature and you just signed it in the lockup in
there a minute ago; is that correct?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: That is your signature? And do you waive or give up
your preliminary hearing rights?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You understand you've had the right to have
preliminary hearings?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay.

25

R. 301-03 (emphasis added) see also R. 293-98 (Plea Statement). The trial court also
had an opportunity to observe Helbach's demeanor during the hearing and
apparently saw nothing amiss.6
In sum, there was nothing before the trial court to indicate Helbach was not
competent during the change-of-plea hearing and none of the psychological
evaluations suggests otherwise. Thus, Helbach7s unsupported, self-serving claims
that he was mentally incompetent should be rejected.
II.
THE POST-CONVICTION COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED
THAT HELBACH HAD NOT MET HIS BURDEN TO
ESTABLISH INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL,
Helbach has not met his burden to demonstrate ineffective assistance of
counsel. The burden to prove such a claim is extremely high. To prevail, Helbach
must meet the two-part test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984), and adopted by the courts in Utah. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Galetka, 933 P.2d 987,
989 (Utah 1997). Helbach must establish that:
1.

His attorney's performance was deficient, and

Additionally, in the Certificate of Defense Attorney attached to the plea
statement, trial counsel certified, "I know defendant has read the statement or that I
have read it to defendant; I have discussed it with defendant and believe that
defendant fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and
physically competent/7 See, e.g., R. 297.
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2.

The deficient performance prejudiced his defense.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Petition's claims fail under both prongs.
To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, Helbach must demonstrate that
counsel's "representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. This requires a showing that Helbach's attorney made
errors so egregious that he or she was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed
to the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Id.; accord Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516,
522 (Utah), cert, denied, 115 S. Ct. 431(1994); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182,186 (Utah
1990). To establish that such serious errors occurred, a defendant must identify
counsel's specific acts or omissions that "fall outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance." State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524,532 (Utah App.
1997) (citations omitted and internal quotation marks omitted). "'Proof of ineffective
assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable
reality.'" State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157,1162 (Utah App. 1998) (citing Fernandez v.
Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993)).
To establish deficient performance, a petitioner must "rebut the strong presumption
that under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial
strategy." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 1 19, 12 P.3d 92. To prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance, petitioner must demonstrate '"that counsel's actions were not
conscious trial strategy,'" and "that there was a Tack of any conceivable tactical basis' for
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counsel's actions." State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 635 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v.
Elliftitz, 835 P.2d 170,174 (Utah. App.1992)).
Furthermore, it is not enough for petitioner to show that counsel's
performance could have been better. The Sixth Amendment entitles petitioner "only
to effective assistance of counsel, not to a right to the best or most complete
representation available/7 State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250,1259 (Utah 1993); see also
Boyd v. Ward, 179 F.3d 904, 914 (10th Cir. 1999) (the court may find counsel's
performance constitutionally deficient only if petitioner establishes that counsel's
performance was "completely unreasonable, not merely wrong.").
The post-conviction court properly determined that Helbach's knowing and
voluntary guilty plea waived all ineffective assistance claims concerning pre-plea
representation. R. 216; see also State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989)
(defendant who pleads guilty "is deemed to have admitted all of the essential
elements of the crime charged and thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects,
including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations") (emphasis added); State v. Hardy,
2002 UT App 244, ^ 8 , 1 3 , 54 P.3d 645 (declining to address pre-plea claims that
protective order statutes were overbroad and vague because defendant entered
knowing and voluntary guilty plea). Thus, the only unwaived claims concern his
counsel's representation during the plea negotiation process. These claims would
be (1) that his counsel should have been aware of Helbach's alleged incompetence
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and should not have allowed him to plead guilty, see, e.g., Aplt. Br. at 4-5, and (2) his
counsel should not have considered his confession in recommending that he plead
guilty. E.g., id. at 19.
These claims fail. First, Helbach's claim that his trial attorney was ineffective
because he did not move to suppress the confession was waived by the knowing
and voluntary guilty plea. Second, the claim that his attorney was ineffective
because he should have realized Helbach was incompetent is not supported by the
record.
A.

Helbach Waived His Claim That His Trial Counsel was
Ineffective for Not Challenging the Admissibility of
His Confession.

Helbach7s knowing and voluntary guilty plea waived his claim that his
attorney was ineffective for not attempting to suppress the confession. Accordingly,
the post-conviction court properly dismissed this claim.
A post-conviction petitioner cannot raise claims concerning pre-plea
constitutional violations, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
because such claims are waived by a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. 'The
ineffectiveness of counsel that contributes to a flawed guilty plea, however, can
spare a defendant the consequences of her plea only if the defendant makes out the
same case required of every defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea: that the plea
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was not knowing and voluntary." State v. Rhinhart, 2007 UT 61,113,167 P.3d 1046.
A defendant who pleads guilty "is deemed to have admitted all of the essential
elements of the crime charged and thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects,
including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations/' State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275,1278
(Utah 1989) (emphasis added); see also State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, |% 8,13, 54
P.3d 645 (declining to address pre-plea claims that protective order statutes were
overbroad and vague because defendant entered knowing and voluntary guilty
plea). Furthermore, a voluntary guilty plea constitutes an admission of the elements
of the offense. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459,466 (1969); accord Salazar v.
Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 991 (Utah 1993); State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309,1313 (Utah
1987).
As demonstrated in section LA., above, Helbach's plea was knowingly and
voluntarily entered. Accordingly, he cannot claim that his attorney was ineffective
for not attempting to suppress the confession.
B.

Helbach Has Not Demonstrated that His Trial Counsel
Was Ineffective For Not Requesting a Competency
Hearing.

Helbach has claimed that his counsel was ineffective because he did not move
for a competency hearing, Aplt. Br. at 4, even though he allegedly knew Helbach
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attempted suicide at the Davis County Jail and that he displayed symptoms of
mental illness while in the military. Id. at 5. This claim is without merit.
As discussed in section LB., above, even assuming Helbach suffers from some
form of mental illness, that alone does not establish he was incompetent to stand
trial or enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. As the Court of Appeals
observed in defendant's previous and virtually identical case: "The fact that a
person is mentally ill, displays bizarre, volatile, and irrational behavior, or has a
history of mental illness, does not mean that he or she is incompetent to stand
trial/" Helbach III, 2007 UT App 191U, f 1 (quoting Jacobs v. State, 2001 UT17,116,
20 P.3d 382); see also Kohler v. Kelly, 890 F. Supp. 207, 213 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (suicide
attempt insufficient to alert counsel to competency issue where nothing else in the
record could substantiate a finding of mental incompetence), ajfd, 58 F.3d 58 (2nd
Cir. 1995), cert denied, 516 U.S. 995 (1999); cf. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162,168,17880 (1975) (suicide attempt coupled with history of irrational behavior required an
inquiry into Drope's competence).
Because Helbach has offered no evidence to establish his incompetence, the
post-conviction court corrected ruled that his attorney had no reason to think he
was incompetent, especially when the record demonstrates that Helbach was
attentive and responsive at the plea hearing. R. 391. During the plea colloquy,
Helbach also affirmed he was mentally competent and not under the influence of
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drugs or suffering from mental illness.

Id.

Accordingly, Helbach has not

demonstrated his attorney was ineffective in proceeding with the guilty plea.
III.
HELBACH WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING.
Helbach claims the post-conviction court erred in not ordering an evidentiary
hearing because there were factual disputes that needed to be resolved. Aplt. Br. at
28. This claims is without merit.
First, Helbach never requested an evidentiary hearing. In his petition, he
simply asked that the court "set aside or vacate the plea and conviction and allow
the defendant to proceed to trial/' R. 33. In his " Answer" to the State's motion to
dismiss, Helbach "reques[ed] that the court order briefing on any issue that the
court warrents [sic] more treatment... "R. 246. Because Helbach never requested an
evidentiary hearing, he must show on appeal that it was plain error for the postconviction court not to have done so sua sponte. See State v. Richardson, 2009 UT App
40, ^ 7-8, 204 P.3d 872 (because defendant failed to request evidentiary hearing
during sentencing, claim on appeal reviewed for plain error); see also, id., at f 8 (to
establish plain error, defendant must show "that an error must have occurred, must
have been harmful, and should have been obvious to the trial court"). Helbach had
not argued plain error or any other exception to the preservation rule, so this Court

32

should not reach it. State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229, n.5 (Utah 1995). This claim
fails for that reason.
Second, even if Helbach had requested an evidentiary hearing, he cannot
show that the post-conviction would have granted his request. "An evidentiary
hearing is necessary only when a material fact is in dispute/7 State v. Clegg, 2002 UT
App 279, \ 9, 54 P.3d 653. In his petition, Helbach did not meet his burden to
proffer or identify evidence demonstrating a material factual dispute. Nor has he
done so in his brief on appeal. Helbach claims an evidentiary hearing was necessary
because the case is "fact sensitive" due to his "mechanical[] answers" to questions
during the plea colloquy, which he claims did not establish the plea was made
knowingly. Aplt. Br. at 30. Additionally, he claims an evidentiary hearing is
needed to sort through "the issues involved in the ineffective counsel claim" and to
develop "proof of appellant's alibis." Id. Because Helbach offers no evidence to
support these allegations, they cannot create a factual dispute requiring an
evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the post-conviction court had no basis for
scheduling an evidentiary hearing, even if Helbach had requested one.
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IV.
ANY
REMAINING
APPELLATE
CLAIMS
ARE
INADEQUATELY BRIEFED AND MUST BE REJECTED.
Any remaining claims in Helbach's brief must be dismissed because they are
inadequately briefed. "It is well established that a reviewing court will not address
arguments that are not adequately briefed/' State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299,304 (Utah
1998). Under rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appellate brief "must
be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and
free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters/' Utah R. App.
P. 24(k). "An issue is inadequately briefed when 'the overall analysis of the issue is
so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court/"
Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, % 8,995 P.2d 14 (quoting State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d
299, 305 (Utah 1998)).
While a reviewing court may grant an appellant "some leeway due to his
status as a pro se litigant, th[e] court will not assume his 'burden of argument and
research/" Treffv. Hinckley, 2001 UT 50, lj 11, 26 P.3d 212 (quoting State v. Thomas,
961 P.2d 299, 204 (Utah 1998)) (in turn quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450
(Utah 1988)) (additional internal quotation marks omitted). "As a general rule, a
party who represents himself will be held to the same standard of knowledge and
practice as any qualified member of the bar [.]" Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207,
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
the post-conviction court's decision denying post-conviction relief.
Respectfully submitted September 24, 2009.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

BRETT J. DEL££>RTO
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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1213 (Utah 1983).

Although pro se litigants "'should be accorded every

consideration that may reasonably be indulged. . . .'" Id. (quoting Heathman v.
Hatch, 13 Utah 2d 266,372 P.2d 990,991 (1962)), they still must follow the appellate
rules. Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT11, f 4, 67 P.3d 1000.
Helbach's brief consists largely of renumbered pages from his post-conviction
petition. Pages 4-8 of his brief consists of excerpted pages from the petition alleing
instances of what appellant regards as ineffective assistance of counsel with no
analysis or any attempt to apply controlling authority. Similarly, pages 9-14, also
excerpted from the petition, reiterate an irrelevant discussion of the trial court's
alleged failure to comply with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in
accepting appellant's guilty plea.
As a result, most of Helbach's claims are cryptic and somewhat haphazard.
The State has attempted to cover the claims addressed by the post-conviction court
as well as any others that appear remotely colorable. Any additional claims should
be rejected for inadequate briefing.
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Addenda

Addendum A

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure

Kr=
Chapter 15. Inquiry Into Sanity of Defendant

§ 77-15-5. Order for hearing—Stay of other proceedingsExaminations of defendant-Scope of examination and report
(1) When a petition is filed pursuant to Section 77-15-3 raising the issue of the
defendant's competency to stand trial or when the court raises the issue of the defendant's
competency pursuant to Section 77-15-4, the court in which proceedings are pending
shall stay all proceedings. If the proceedings are in a court other than the district court in
which the petition is filed, the district court shall notify that court of the filing of the
petition. The district court in which the petition is filed shall pass upon the sufficiency of
the allegations of incompetency. If a petition is opposed by either party, the court shall,
prior to granting or denying the petition, hold a limited hearing solely for the purpose of
determining the sufficiency of the petition. If the court finds that the allegations of
incompetency raise a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competency to stand trial, it
shall enter an order for a hearing on the mental condition of the person who is the subject
of the petition.
(2)(a) After the granting of a petition and prior to a full competency hearing, the court
may order the Department of Human Services to examine the person and to report to the
court concerning the defendant's mental condition.
(b) The defendant shall be examined by at least two mental health experts not involved
in the current treatment of the defendant.
(c) If the issue is sufficiently raised in the petition or if it becomes apparent that the
defendant may be incompetent due to mental retardation, at least one expert
experienced in mental retardation assessment shall evaluate the defendant. Upon
appointment of the experts, the petitioner or other party as directed by the court shall
provide information and materials to the examiners relevant to a determination of the
defendant's competency and shall provide copies of the charging document, arrest or
incident reports pertaining to the charged offense, known criminal history information,
and known prior mental health evaluations and treatments.
(d) The prosecuting and defense attorneys shall cooperate in providing the relevant
information and materials to the examiners, and the court may make the necessary
orders to provide the information listed in Subsection (2)(c) to the examiners. The court
may provide in its order for a competency examination of a defendant that custodians
of mental health records pertaining to the defendant shall provide those records to the

examiners without the need for consent of the defendant or further order of the court.
(3) During the examination under Subsection (2), unless the court or the executive
director of the department directs otherwise, the defendant shall be retained in the same
custody or status he was in at the time the examination was ordered.
(4) The experts shall in the conduct of their examination and in their report to the court
consider and address, in addition to any other factors determined to be relevant by the
experts:
(a) the defendant's present capacity to:
(i) comprehend and appreciate the charges or allegations against him;
(ii) disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind;
(iii) comprehend and appreciate the range and nature of possible penalties, if
applicable, that may be imposed in the proceedings against him;
(iv) engage in reasoned choice of legal strategies and options;
(v) understand the adversary nature of the proceedings against him;
(vi) manifest appropriate courtroom behavior; and
(vii) testify relevantly, if applicable;
(b) the impact of the mental disorder, or mental retardation, if any, on the nature and
quality of the defendant's relationship with counsel;
(c) if psychoactive medication is currently being administered:
(i) whether the medication is necessary to maintain the defendant's competency; and
(ii) the effect of the medication, if any, on the defendant's demeanor and affect and
ability to participate in the proceedings.
(5) If the expert's opinion is that the defendant is incompetent to proceed, the expert shall
indicate in the report:
(a) which of the above factors contributes to the defendant's incompetency;
(b) the nature of the defendant's mental disorder or mental retardation and its
relationship to the factors contributing to the defendant's incompetency;
(c) the treatment or treatments appropriate and available; and

(d) the defendant's capacity to give informed consent to treatment to restore
competency.
(6) The experts examining the defendant shall provide an initial report to the court and
the prosecuting and defense attorneys within 30 days of the receipt of the court's order.
The report shall inform the court of the examiner's opinion concerning the competency of
the defendant to stand trial, or, in the alternative, the examiner may inform the court in
writing that additional time is needed to complete the report. If the examiner informs the
court that additional time is needed, the examiner shall have up to an additional 30 days
to provide the report to the court and counsel. The examiner must provide the report
within 60 days from the receipt of the court's order unless, for good cause shown, the
court authorizes an additional period of time to complete the examination and provide the
report.
(7) Any written report submitted by the experts shall:
(a) identify the specific matters referred for evaluation;
(b) describe the procedures, techniques, and tests used in the examination and the
purpose or purposes for each;
(c) state the expert's clinical observations, findings, and opinions on each issue referred
for examination by the court, and indicate specifically those issues, if any, on which the
expert could not give an opinion; and
(d) identify the sources of information used by the expert and present the basis for the
expert's clinical findings and opinions.
(8)(a) Any statement made by the defendant in the course of any competency
examination, whether the examination is with or without the consent of the defendant,
any testimony by the expert based upon such statement, and any other fruits of the
statement may not be admitted in evidence against the defendant in any criminal
proceeding except on an issue respecting mental condition on which the defendant has
introduced evidence. The evidence may be admitted, however, where relevant to a
determination of the defendant's competency.
(b) Prior to examining the defendant, examiners should specifically advise the
defendant of the limits of confidentiality as provided under Subsection (8)(a).
(9) When the report is received the court shall set a date for a mental hearing which shall
be held in not less than five and not more than 15 days, unless the court enlarges the time
for good cause. Any person or organization directed by the department to conduct the
examination may be subpoenaed to testify at the hearing. If the experts are in conflict as
to the competency of the defendant, all experts should be called to testify at the hearing if
reasonably available. The court may call any examiner to testify at the hearing who is not

called by the parties If the court calls an examiner, counsel for the parties may crossexamine the expert.
(10) A person shall be presumed competent unless the court, by a preponderance of the
evidence, finds the person incompetent to proceed. The burden of proof is upon the
proponent of incompetency at the hearing. An adjudication of incompetency to proceed
shall not operate as an adjudication of incompetency to give informed consent for
medical treatment or for any other purpose, unless specifically set forth in the court order.
(1 l)(a) If the court finds the defendant incompetent to stand trial, its order shall contain
findings addressing each of the factors in Subsections (4)(a) and (b) of this section. The
order issued pursuant to Subsection 77-15-6(1) which the court sends to the facility
where the defendant is committed or to the person who is responsible for assessing his
progress toward competency shall be provided contemporaneously with the
transportation and commitment order of the defendant, unless exigent circumstances
require earlier commitment in which case the court shall forward the order within five
working days of the order of transportation and commitment of the defendant.
(b) The order finding the defendant incompetent to stand trial shall be accompanied by:
(i) copies of the reports of the experts filed with the court pursuant to the order of
examination if not provided pre\ iously;
(ii) copies of any of the psychiatric, psychological or social work reports submitted
to the court relative to the mental condition of the defendant; and
(iii) any other documents made available to the court by either the defense or the
prosecution, pertaining to the defendant's current or past mental condition.
(12) If the court finds it necessary to order the defendant transported prior to the
completion of findings and compilation of documents required under Subsection (11), the
transportation and commitment order delivering the defendant to the Utah State Hospital,
or other mental health facility as directed by the executive director of the Department of
Human Services or his designee, shall indicate that the defendant's commitment is based
upon a finding of incompetency, and the mental health facility's copy of the order shall be
accompanied by the reports of any experts filed with the court pursuant to the order of
examination. The executive director of the Department of Human Services or his
designee may refuse to accept a defendant as a patient unless he is accompanied by a
transportation and commitment order which is accompanied by the reports.
(13) Upon a finding of incompetency to stand trial by the court, the prosecuting and
defense attorneys shall provide information and materials relevant to the defendant's
competency to the facility where the defendant is committed or to the person responsible
for assessing his progress towards competency. In addition to any other materials, the
prosecuting attorney shall pro\ ide

(a) copies of the charging document and supporting affidavits or other documents used
in the determination of probable cause;
(b) arrest or incident reports prepared by a law enforcement agency pertaining to the
charged offense; and
(c) information concerning the defendant's known criminal history.
(14) The court may make any reasonable order to insure compliance with this section.
(15) Failure to comply with this section shall not result in the dismissal of criminal
charges.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1980, c. 15, §2; Laws 1988, c. 1, $ 399; Laws 1990. c. 127, $ 1; Laws 1991, c.
166. § 4; Laws 1993, c. 142, § 2; Laws 1994, c. 162, $ 4; Laws 2002, 5th Sp.Sess., c. 8. $
132. eff. Sept 8,2002; Laws 2003. c. 82. $ 1. eff. Ma\ 5, 2003: Laws 2008. c. 212, § K
eff May 5. 2008.
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER DISMISSING
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF

AARON HELBACH,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH,

Case No. 060900429

Respondent.
Judse Roser S. Dutson

By Memorandum dated May 21, 2008, this Court granted the State's Motion to
Dismiss Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Now being fully advised, the Court enters
the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order dismissing the petition for
post-conviction relief.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On March 21, 2003, petitioner was charged in Second District Court,

Weber County, with three counts of aggravated robbery in three separate informations.
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See case nos. 031901411, 031901412 and 031901413 ("the Weber County cases"). In
case no. 031901411, it was alleged that petitioner, claiming to have a gun, robbed an
Arby's restaurant on February 14, 2003. In case no. 031901412, it was alleged that
petitioner, claiming to have a knife, robbed a Sinclair station on March 11, 2003.
Petitioner was also charged in the Second Judicial District Court in Davis County with
two armed robberies of convenience stores that occurred on February 13, 2003. See case
no. 031700453 ("the Davis County case").
2.

Petitioner ultimately pleaded guilty to a total of three counts of aggravated

robbery. On April 7, 2003, petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated robbery
in the Davis County case and the other count of aggravated robbery in that case was
dismissed pursuant to a plea bargain. On August 18, 2003, petitioner pleaded guilty to
two counts of aggravated robbery in the Weber County cases
3.

In exchange for petitioner's guilty plea to two counts of aggravated robbery

in the Weber County cases (case nos. 031901411 and 031901412), the State agreed to
dismiss the third count (case no. 031901413) and to recommend that any prison term be
imposed concurrently with any term imposed in the Davis County case.
4.

During the August 18, 2003, change-of-plea hearing in the Weber County

cases, the contents of the Plea Statement were incorporated into the record through a
colloquy among the Court, the petitioner and defense counsel.
5.

On September 8, 2003, petitioner was sentenced to two terms of five years

to life at the Utah State Prison.

.?-

6.

Petitioner filed no timely appeal.

7.

On March 5, 2004, petitioner filed a pleading in the Weber County

criminal cases captioned "Motion to be Re-Sentenced Nunc Pro Tunc" in which he
claimed inter alia that his plea was improperly and involuntarily entered due to
mental illness. This Court denied the motion by order dated July 11, 2004.
8.

On August 9, 2004, petitioner filed a "Notice of Appeal/'

9.

On November 2, 2004, the Utah Court of Appeals dismissed the

appeal. The appeals court noted that petitioner's motion to be resentenced w7as "in
substance" a motion to withdraw his plea, which must be filed before sentencing.
Because petitioner's motion to withdraw his plea was filed months too late, the
trial court had no jurisdiction to consider it and the court of appeals had no
jurisdiction over the appeal.
10

Petitioner next attempted to challenge his convictions in the Weber County

cases by filing a petition for extraordinary relief under rule 19, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, which also sought habeas corpus relief under appellate rule 20.
11.

The Utah Court of Appeals denied that petition, explaining that rule 19

requires that "no plain, speedy or adequate remedy exists," but that petitioner had such a
remedy available under rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The court referred the
petition to the Second Judicial District Court to the extent that it raised issues for review
under the Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 -110
(West 2004), and rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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12.

In evaluating petitioner's claims under the PCRA, this Court initially

denied the requested relief and dismissed the petition in its entirety. However, the Court
later reconsidered, agreed to allow some of petitioner's claims to go forward and ordered
the State to file a response.
13.

Meanwhile, the Second Judicial Court, Davis County, dismissed virtually

identical claims petitioner made in the post-conviction challenge to his guilty plea in the
Davis County case. Petitioner appealed that dismissal and, on June 1, 2007, the Utah
Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. Helbach v. State, 2007 UT
App 191 U, TJ2 (Memorandum Decision).
14.

The State filed a Response to the petition challenging petitioner's

convictions in the Weber County cases, requesting that it be dismissed.
15.

On May 21, 2008, this Court granted the State's motion to dismiss.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

In the post-conviction petition, petitioner claim his plea was invalid due to

violations of rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as other alleged
violations of rules governing the entry of guilty pleas.
2.

Petitioner's claims fail to the extent that he alleges only technical violations

of rule 11 governing the entry of guilty pleas because he has failed in his burden to
demonstrate that his plea was in fact involuntary. Bluemel v. State, 2007 UT 90, ^f 18,
173 P.3d 842; accordSalazar v. Warden, Utah State Prison, 852 P.2d 988 (Utah 1993).
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3.

Under the correct post-conviction review standards, petitioner cannot

demonstrate that his plea was unknowing or involuntary because such claims are
contradicted by petitioner's Plea Statement, in which he affirms that he was entering his
guilty plea freely and without duress, as well as petitioner's testimony during his changeof-plea hearing, during which petitioner affirmed that he understood and accepted the
terms of the plea agreement and that he was doing so knowingly and voluntarily.
4.

Petitioner's also claims that he was not advised of the elements of

aggravated robbery or of how his conduct met those elements. These claims are also
contradicted by the record. In the Plea Statement, petitioner also fully acknowledged the
elements of the aggravated robbery and the factual basis for the plea: "I unlawfully and
intentionally took or attempted to take personal property from another by the threatened
use of a gun."
5.

The Plea Statement also states:

I stipulate and agree .. . that the following facts describe my conduct and the
conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a
basis for the court to accept my guilty . . . pleas and prove the elements of the
crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty: On 2-14-2003 and 3-11-2003 I attempted
to take property from (1) Arby's and (2) D. Magoon by use of a gun (1) and a
knife (2).
6.

In addition, the trial court also reviewed the elements in more detail during

the plea colloquy to ensure petitioner understood.
7.

Petitioner also claims he was not advised that, if he went to trial, the State

had the burden of proving every element of the crime. However, the Plea Statement
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explicitly states: "At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of
the charge beyond a reasonable doubt."
8.

Petitioner next complains that he was not advised of his right to appeal.

Because petitioner pleaded guilty, he explicitly waived his right to appeal. If petitioner
wished to appeal, he would first have to timely move to withdraw his plea. The Plea
Statement advised petitioner that if he wished to withdraw his plea, he must file a written
motion before sentencing. Petitioner did not do so. Thus, he effectively had no appellate
rights once he entered his guilty plea.
9.

Petitioner claims "the court never explained that I must be imprisoned for 5

years before being eligible for parole" and that he could be imprisoned for life. This
claim is without merit. On the first page of the Plea Statement—the same statement
petitioner has repeatedly affirmed having read and understood—petitioner acknowledges
that "I am pleading guilty to the following crimes: . . . 2 (cts) Ag. Robbery," which may
be punished by "MIN/MAX \ND/OR MINIMUM MANDATORY" sentences of "5-life USP
and [$]20.000 fine on each." Although expressed in abbreviated form, the language "5life USP" clearly means that petitioner was pleading guilty to crimes that would result in
a sentence at the Utah State Prison for a minimum of five years and up to life.
10.

Petitioner claims that his plea was unknowing and involuntary because he

was m entail} incompetent at the time it was entered. He also claims the Court and his
defense attorney erred in not discovering his incompetence and requesting a competency
examination.
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11.

Under Utah law, "[n]o person who is incompetent to proceed shall be tried

for a public offense." Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-1 (West 2004). Incompetence to proceed
is defined as a defendant's 'inability to have a rational and factual understanding of the
proceedings against him or of the punishment specified for the offense charged; or. . . his
inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the proceedings against him with
a reasonable degree of rational understanding/' Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2 (West 2004).
12.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that ;t[a] trial court must hold a

competency hearing when there is 'a substantial question of possible doubt as to a
defendant's competency at the time of the guilty plea.'" Jacobs v. State, 2001 UT 17, If
13, 20 P.3d 382 (citation omitted). In determining whether the trial court should have
ordered a competency hearing, "only those facts that were before the [trial] court when
the plea was entered" should be considered. State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, % 50, 63 P.3d
731.
13.

In support of his alleged incompetence, petitioner offers reports from

doctors, psychologists and criminal justice evaluators, which he claims show that he was
incompetent to plead guilty. These reports, however illuminating they may be for
purposes of illustrating petitioner's mental health issues, provide no reason to doubt his
competence to plead guilty. The Utah Court of Appeals, which also evaluated the reports
because defendant used them to support identical claims raised in his post-conviction
challenge to his guilty plea in the Davis County case, concluded that the reports "assessed
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mental health, not competency," and were, therefore, irrelevant to petitioner's
competence. Helbach v. State. 2007 UT App 191 U, ^j 2 (Memorandum Decision).
14.

Similarly, in this case, there was nothing before the trial court to raise a

substantial question of possible doubt about petitioner's competence to plead guilty.
Petitioner fully participated in the change-of-plea hearing by responding coherently to the
court's questions, repeatedly affirming that he understood the contents of the Plea
Statement, and that he was knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty and waiving his
constitutional rights. The trial court also had an opportunity to observe petitioner's
demeanor during the hearing and detected no sign of incompetence or mental illness.
15.

Petitioner next claims ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail,

petitioner must establish that his attorney's performance was deficient and that the
deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687(1984).
16.

This Court previously determined petitioner's knowing and voluntary guilty

plea waived all ineffective assistance claims concerning pre-plea representation. The
only unwaived claims concern his counsel's representation during the plea negotiation
process.
17.

Petitioner claimed that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to

move for a competency hearing even though he allegedly knew petitioner attempted
suicide at the Davis County Jail and that he displayed symptoms of mental illness while
in the military.
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18.

However, because petitioner has offered no evidence to establish his

incompetence, there is no reason to believe his attorney had any reason to think he was
incompetent, especially when the record demonstrates that petitioner was attentive and
responsive at the plea hearing. He also affirmed he was mentally competent and not
under the influence of drugs or mental illness. Accordingly, petitioner has not
demonstrated his attorney was ineffective in proceeding with the guilty plea.
19.

Nor has petitioner offered any evidence to substantiate his claim that his

attorney erroneously advised him to plead guilty, despite supposed evidence that
petitioner's confession was coerced. To succeed on this claim, petitioner must first
demonstrate that there wras enough evidence to support a claim that the confession was
coerced and that a motion to suppress would have been meritorious. See United States v.
Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 360 (7th Cir.2005) ("When the claim of ineffective assistance
is based on counsel's failure to present a motion to suppress, we have required that a
defendant prove the motion was meritorious."), cert, denied, 546 U.S. 1097 (2006).
20.

The Utah Supreme Court has identified a non-exhaustive list of objective

and subjective factors that should be employed to determine whether, under the totality of
the circumstances, a confession was improperly coerced. State v Rettenberger, 1999 UT
80, 984 P.2d 1009. "Objective" factors are potentially coercive interrogation techniques
such as misrepresentations, the "false friend" technique and improper threats of
punishment or promises of leniency. Id. atffl[20-32. "Subjective" factors include
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characteristics of the defendant such as age. maturity, intelligence and possible mental
impairments that make a suspect susceptible to manipulation. Id. at ^ 37.
21.

Petitioner has offered no evidence whatsoever to support the existence of

any factors, subjective or objective, as identified in Rettenberger. Rather, petitioner
merely asserts that he was "manipulated" and that "the prosecution and defense played on
my mental illnesses." He also claims that his counsel "failed to properly investigate the
plea bargain," "failed to investigate and prepare a defense," "failed to make an
independent investigation into the Weber County confessions.. ." and "failed . . . to
suppress incompetent confession." But he provides no evidence or even specific
examples to back up his claims. In short, petitioner offers nothing but his own selfserving and highly generalized allegations of coercion. Because petitioner has failed to
offer any evidence or even any specific examples of improper police conduct, it is
impossible for him to demonstrate that his attorney had any reason to question the
admissibility of the confession.
22.

Petitioner claims that the Presentence Investigation Report (PSIR) that was

prepared for sentencing in his case was inaccurate. Further, he claims he did not receive
the report until nine months after sentencing. These claims are meritless.
23.

A court may order a pre-sentence report from the department of corrections

if more information about the defendant is necessary for sentencing purposes. Utah Code
Ann. § 77-18-1(5) (West 2004). When a report is requested, the department is required to
provide the report to the defendant's attorney three working days before sentencing.

-10-

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a). Any inaccuracies in the report should be resolved
before sentencing if possible. Id. If inaccuracies cannot be resolved before sentencing,
they should be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, who may grant an
additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies. Id. If a party fails to
challenge the report's accuracy at the time of sentencing, ''that matter shall be considered
to be waived." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(b).
24.

The cover page of the PSIR lists its due date as May 14, 2003 and lists the

sentencing date as May 19, 2003. Presumably, the report was available on its due date,
which was well before the actual sentencing on September 8, 2003. At the time of
sentencing, the report had been provided to the trial court—it was referred to repeatedly
during the hearing—and presumably also to defense counsel. Although not explicitly
stated, it is clear from the context that petitioner was also familiar with the contents of the
PSIR. Because petitioner failed to point out any alleged inaccuracies at sentencing, any
claims concerning the inaccuracies is waived. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(b).
25.

Additionally, even if petitioner's claims were not waived, the report does

not appear to be inaccurate. The only specific inaccuracy petitioner mentions concerns
his claim he was in Youth Corrections "custody" from 1996 to 2001.
26.

However, it is not clear how7 this comment is related to any alleged

inaccuracy. The PSIR indicates that petitioner was placed in a Youth Corrections
community program on July 7, 1996 for rape or sexual abuse of a child under 14 and that
this status was continued on January 29, 1997 for assault. On September 22, 1997, he
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was placed in a secure facility for lewdness and that status was continued on October 2,
1997, for sodomy on a victim under the age of 14. He was paroled on February 8, 2000
and Youth Corrections jurisdiction was terminated on May 29. 2001. Thus, petitioner
was in fact under the jurisdiction of Youth Corrections from 1996 to 2001. If by
"custody" petitioner means that he was incarcerated in a Youth Corrections facility from
1996 to 2001, then there may be a discrepancy. Still, it is unclear whether the report is
inaccurate or whether the apparent discrepancy is simply due to a difference in
terminology.
27.

More fundamentally, even assuming that petitioner has identified

inaccuracies in the report, he has failed to demonstrate how any inaccuracy prejudiced
him in any wray. Petitioner has not claimed that he did not commit any of felonies listed
in the PSIR; rather, he only seems to take issue with his custody status from 1996 to
2001. Because this alleged inaccuracy had no apparent impact on the court's decision—
and defendant has not suggested how it could have affected the court's decision—
petitioner cannot show any prejudice. Accordingly, this claim is without merit.
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ORDER
Based on the motions, memoranda and other pleadings filed by both parties, and
based on the arguments of counsel and petitioner, and because there is good cause for
doing so,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
The State's motion to dismiss the petition for post-conviction relief is GRANTED.
The petition's claims are DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and the Court
DENIES post-conviction relief on all claims.
Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, "[a]ny party may appeal from the trial
court's final judgment on a petition for post-conviction relief to the appellate court
having jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-l 10 (West 2004).
DATED this 7&

day of $ n e , 2008.
BY THE CO

Judge Roger S. Dutson
Second4udicial District Court Judge
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Mailed to Aaron Helbach on June 5. 2008
Submitted to the Court on June 13, 2008, by
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
Brett J. DelPorto
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

Brett J. DelPortc/
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Aaron L. Helbach #34774
CUCF
PO Box 550
Gunnison, Utah 84634
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the l^^day of June, 2008,1 served a copy of the
foregoing by causing the same to be mailed, via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Aaron L. Helbach #34774
CUCF
PO Box 550
Gunnison, Utah 84634
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

STATE OF UTAH

Plaintiff,

Case No. OZ\°iO

/fypUh litlka-i
Defendant.

Judge

| 4 l 2 F5>

Do h * 4UG 1 9 2003

__, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been
(Th
I,
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights;
NOTIFICATION OF CHARGES

I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes:
CRIME & STATUTORY
PROVISION

DEGREE

PUNISHMENT
MIN/MAX AND/OR
MINIMUM MANDATORY

A.
B.
C.
D.
I have received a copy of the (Amende
read to me, and I understand the nature and the
guilty (or no contest).

against me. I have read it, or had it
cxf the crime(s) to which I am pleading

044

The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are:

I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed
above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the foregoing
crimes.) 1 stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do no dispute or contest) that the
following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally
liable. These facts provide a basis for the Court to accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas and
prove Jhe elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest):

' "• o^y

k <i dsk to, G-\ (MihW i \ nl^J. r^

I

WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under
the constitutions of Utah and the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty (or no
contest) I will give up all the following rights:
COUNSEL: I know that 1 have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I understand that I
might later, if the Judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's
sendee to me.
(have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel, I
have dori^^a-krtowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons:

@)

045

If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I
understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty (or
no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my
guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
, j
\
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is V [7ffrf
I f ( M ' ^
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, anMhe "consequences of my
guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
JURY TRIAL. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest).
CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES.

I know that if I were to

have a jury trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against
me and b) by attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity
to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me.
RIGHT TO COMPEL WITNESSES. I know that if I were to have a jury trial I could call
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of the witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State
would pay those costs.
RIGHT TO TESTIFY AND PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.

I know that if I

were to have a jury trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I
chose not to testify, no on could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I
also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal
to testily against me.
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF.

I know that if I do not plead

guilty (or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the
charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty" and
my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each
element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must
be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of innocence
and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.
APPEAL. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge,

I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest).
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.

^

CONSEQUENCES OF ENTERING A GUILTY (OR NO CONTEST) PLEA

I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a
mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fire, or both.
POTENTIAL PENALTIES.

I know that in addition to a fine, an eight-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. I
also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any
restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement.
CONSECUTIVE/CONCURRENT PRISON TERMS.

I know that if there is more than one

crime involved, the sentence may be imposed one after the other (consecutively), or they may run
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime
that 1 plead to. 1 also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another
offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or
no contest) piea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense
to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law
requires the Court to impose consecutive sentences unless the Court finds and states on the
record that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate.
PLEA BARGAIN: My guilty (or no contest) plea(s)(is/are not) the result of a plea bargain
between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea
bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below:

I Or
.
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TRIAL JUDGE NOT BOUND. I know

that any charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecution attorney are not binding
on the Judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the Judge
may do are not binding on the Judge.
DEFENDANT'S CERTIFICATION OF VOLUNTARINESS

I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats or unlawful
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises
except those contained in this statement have been made to me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand its
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contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the
statements are correct
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
I am
years of age. I have attended school through the jL^Sx^t.
I can read and
understand the English Language. If I do not understand English, an'inteipreter has been
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which
would impair my judgement when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the
influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgement.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or
from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must file a
written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I will be allowed to
withdraw my plea only if I show good cause. I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after
sentencing for any reason.
DATED this \V

day of

jHrfyCU-**

CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY,

idCVl , the defendant
I certify that 1 am the attorney for m
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents
and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an
appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's
criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other representations and
declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are aetfurat^and true.

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

BARNO.Q<~7i->

CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against
, defendant. I have reviewed this statement of defendant and find that
the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and
correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered
defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea
Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to
believe that the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which
the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest.

ORDER

Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and base on any oral representations in Court, the Court witnesses the
signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, knowingly, and
voluntarily made.
I T IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the crime(s)
set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.

DATED this

day of
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DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
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PLAINTIFF, •
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VIDEO TRANSCRIPT
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13

DUTSON

14
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25!
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-

OGDEN, UTAH
MR. CAIKE:

2

SEPTEMBER 8, 2 003

THE NEXT FATTER I HAVE 13 AARON HELBACH.

THAT'S NUMBER 3 AND 4 ON THE CALENDAR.
THE CLERK:

FOR THE RECORD, STATE OF UTAH AARON LONNEL

HELBACH, CASE NUMBER 031901411 AND 031901412, TIME SET FOR
SENTENCING.
MR. CAINS:

JUDGE, THIS 13 MR. HELBACH.

YOU'LL RECALL

THAT BACK ON THE 18TH OF AUGUST, WE ENTERED INTO AN
AGREEMENT.

AGAIN, THE STATE RECOMMENDED CONCURRENT SENTENCES

ON THAT, AND WE WERE JUST GONNA BE SENTENCED THAT DAY.
THE —

THERE WAS SOME UNCLEARNESS ABOUT TWO THINGS.

BUT

ONE WAS

WHETHER THE VICTIMS WANTED TO SPEAK AND ALSO THE RESTITUTION
ISSUE.

IT'S MY UNDERSTANDING THERE ARE NO VICTIMS HERE TO

SPEAK, 3UT WE DO HAVE A RESOLUTION OF THE RESTITUTION ISSUE.
I'VE RECEIVED A LETTER FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
WHICH -- ADDRESSED TO YOU, WHICH I'M ASSUMING YOU GCT,
DELINEATING WHAT THE RESTITUTION FIGURE IS AND THE CASES THAT
ARE APPLICABLE IN THIS COUNTY.
THE COURT:

AND WE ACCEPT THOSE FIGURES.

ARE ANY OF THE VICTIMS IN THIS CASE PRESENT

OR WISH TO BE HEARD?
ALL RIGHT.

JUST ONE PRELIMINARY MATTER:

WHAT IS YOUR

POSITION CONCERNING THE PEQUEST FOR $7 AN HOUR FOR THE ONE
VICTIM —
MR. CAINE:

FOR THE WEEK?

THE COURT:

—

FOR BEING OFF WORK FOR A WEEK?

Ct 4

r\

MR. CAINE:
THAT.

WE'VE ~

WE BELIEVE THAT'S FAIR AND WOULD ACCEPT
WE'RE ASSUMING —

WE'RE NOT CERTAIN IF SEE

WORKED A 4 0-HOUR WEEK, 3UT ASSUMING SHE DID, THAT WOULD EE
$280, AND WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THAT BEING ENTERED.
THE COURT:

AND I'M GOING TO HAVE TO ASK TO REFRESH ME

OF THE DETAILS OF THIS CASE BECAUSE AS I'VE READ THE
PRESENTENCE THAT WAS PREPARED, THERE WAS JUST ONE STATEMENT
STATING THAT THERE WERE —

THERE WAS A GUN USED IN THESE

CASES, AND IN THE DAVIS COUNTY CASE, IT WAS A KNIFE.

BUT I

FRANKLY DON'T RECALL EXACTLY WHAT THE STATE SAID LAST TIME WE
WERE IN COURT AS TO WHAT WAS THE WEAPON USED —
MR. PARMLEY:
THE COURT:

YOUR HONOR, IN CASE --- IN THESE TWO CHARGES.

MR. PARMLEY:

IN CASE 1412, THE VICTIM WAS A DEBBIE

MAGUNE AT SINCLAIR.
SINCLAIR.

THERE WERE ACTUALLY TWO ROBBERIES AT THE

30TH TIMES DEBBIE MAGUNE WAS THE ONE WHO WAS THERE

AND THE VICTIM OF THE ROBBERIES.

ONE TIME HE USED OR

THREATENED A KNIFE AND THE OTHER TIME HE USED OR THREATED A
GUN, AS I RECALL.

THEN IN CASE 1411, THE DEFENDANT WENT TO

THE ARBY'S, AND IN THAT CASE (UNINTELLIGIBLE) THAT MYSELF
(UNINTELLIGIBLE) BRANDISHED A HANDGUN AND DEMANDED MONEY.
THE COURT:

OKAY.

ALL RIGHT.

WISH TO SPEAK TO SENTENCING?

NOW, MR. CAINE, DO YOU

AGAIN, YOU'VE GOT TO KNOW I'M

CONSIDERING IT CONSECUTIVE OR CONCURRENT HERE, CONCERNED
ABOUT IT, EVEN THOUGH THE RECOMMENDATION IS THAT THEY RUN

4

CONCURRENT.
MR. CAINS:

I THINK I'VE -- AGAIN, MY UNDERSTANDING THAT

THE REASON THIS WAS CONTINUED OVER WAS NOT FOR YOU TO
CONSIDER THAT.

IT WAS BECAUSE THERE WAS SOKE CONCERN THAT

THE VICTIM DIDN'T GET A CHANCE TO SPEAK BECAUSE WE WERE DOING
61 IT THAT DAY.
7

RESTITUTION

THAT'S HAPPENED, WE'VE RESOLVED THE
—

8

THE COURT:

WELL, I'LL TELL YOU NOW, IT'S MY CONCERN.

9

MR. CAIKE:

I THINK ~

I THINK THEY SHOULD RUN

10

CONCURRENT.

THAT'S THE AGREEMENT WE MALE.

I THINK UNDER THE

11

CIPCUMSTANCES OF ALL OF THIS THAT FAPTICULARIY WITH THE DAVIS

12

COUNTY CASE AND EVERYTHING, THAT EVEN CONCURRENT SENTENCES

12| WILL OBVIOUSLY RESULT IN A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF TIME ON
14 1 THESE KINDS OF CASES.
THE COURT:
.61

BUT THAT'S APPRCPPIATE.

MR. HELBACH, DO YOU WISH TO SPEAK?

MR. EEL3ACH:

YES, YOUR HONCR.

I'VE HAD PLENTY OF TIME

17

TO THINK ABOUT WHAT I'VE DONE AND, QUITE FRANKLY, IT REALLY

18

IS UP TO YOU WHETHER THESE CHAPGES APE CONCURRENT OR

19

CONSECUTIVE.

2 0 ANYWAY.
21
22

BACK NOW.

I KNEW WHAT I WAS DOING WAS WRONG AND I DID IT

AND THEPE'S NOTHING I CAN DO PEALLY TO TAKE THAT
BEYOND THAT, I DON'T REALLY KNOW WHAT ELSE TO SAY.

THE COURT:

WELL, IN YOUR STATEMENT, MP. HELBACH, YOU

22

SEEM TO KIND OF SHIFT THE BUPDEN AND RESPONSIBILITY ABOUT

24

WHETHER OR NOT YOU CAN BELIEVE ANYONE AND WHETHER OR NOT

251 SOCIETY IS PEPHAPS THE CAUSE OF ALL THIS AND —

AND REAL

^

J- V
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STPANGE RATIONALE THAT I READ INTO IT PERHAPS, BUT AT LEAST
CAUSED ME SOME CONCERN.

IN OTHER WORDS, WHICH SIDE OF THE

FENCE DO YOU WANT TO EE ON.

ARE COPS HERS TO PROTECT AND

SERVE THE PROTECTED OR THE HUNTED.

I QUESTION EVEPYTHING.

AND I WAS WONDEPING WHY YOU MADE THAT STATEMENT.
MR. HELBACH:

QUITS FRANKLY, WHEN I WAS 11 YEARS OLD, MY

FATHER WAS KILLED BY A POLICE OFFICER AND THAT —
CHANGED MY VIEWS TOWARDS COPS FOR A LONG TIME.

THAT

AND WHAT I

MEANT IN THAT STATEMENT WAS BEING LOCKED UP AND SEEING

—

REALIZING WHERE I COULD HAVE CHANGED THINGS DUPING THE TIMES
WHEN I WAS COMMITTING MY CRIMES, I COULD HAVE GONE TO THE
POLICE AND ASKED FOR HELP.

I COULD HAVE GONE TO SOMEBODY AND

GOTTEN HELP WITH MY SITUATION BECAUSE I WAS IN SOME TROUBLE.
AND I DIDN'T BECAUSE OF WHAT HAPPENED WHEN I WAS 11 YEARS
OLD.

BUT WHAT I MEANT WITH THAT STATEMENT WAS, BEING LOCKED

UP AND THE EXPEPIENCES I'VE GONE THROUGH FOR THE LAST FIVE OR
SIX MONTHS, I'VE LEARNED TO QUESTION AND I'M STAPTING TO COME
AROUND AND REALIZE THAT THINGS APEN'T PEALLY THE WAY THAT I
BELIEVED THEY WERE.
THE COURT:

DIDN'T YOU TALK ABOUT THAT SORT OF PROBLEM

WHEN YOU WERE IN 0. AND A. FOR 91 EAYS AS A JUVENILE?
MR. HELBACH:
THE COURT:

I WAS NEVER IN 0. AND A. FOR —

WEREN'T YOU IN 0. AND A.?

MR. HEL3ACH:

NO, THERE'S —

THERE'S A -- I WENT OVER

AND —

010

6

THE COURT:

CH, THAT -- EXCUSE ME, T.•iAT 'S RIGHT, THAT

lOU DID NOT GO INTO 0. AND A • r ::D YOU?

WASN'T YOU.

THAT'S

RIGHT.

MR. CAINE:

THAT'S CORRECT.

THINK YOU WEFS THINKING 0?

A PFEVIO:JS CASE.

THE COURT:

MR. BRYANT, ACTUALLY.

MR. CAINS:

CORRECT.

THE COURT:

STATE WISH TO BE HEARD?

MR. PARMLEY :
TEE COURT:

NO, YOUR HONOR.

AND IS IT THE STATE'S RECOMMENDATION THAT

THE SENTENCES RUN CONCUFRENT WITH EACH OTHER AND WITH THE
DAVIS COUNTY

—

MR. PARMLEY :

YOUR HONOR, THAT WAS ?.r.FT OF THE PLEA

NEGOTIATION IN T HIS CASE.

THE COURT:

THAT IS YOUR PECOMMENDATZ:ON —

MR. PARMLEY :
THE COURT:

- - Y E S , YOUR HONOP.

-- IN THIS CASE.

WELL, *iGAIIN, I STRUGGLE.

/OU HAD FOUR FEL ONIES AS A JUVENILE, AND THEN YCU HAVE THE
DAVIS COUNTY FELONY, AND THIS MAKES SIX FE
TEEM VERY, VERY SERIOUS FELONIES.

3IE3, AND MANY OF

I SUPPOSE I CAN JUST PLACE

MY TRUST IN THE BOARD OF PA?DONS AND HOPE THJ-XT THEif DD WHAT
IS RIGHT .

AND I SUSPECT THEY'RE GOING TO HA"\/S AN OPPORTUNITY

TO OBSERVE YOU AND YOUR CONDUCT WHILE YOU' RE AT THE PRISON.
SO I'M GOING TO GO ALONG WITH IT.

I HAVE A C3?EAT DEAL OF

B.ELUCIAi\hIE BECAUSE ^HuSi A^n, VitVY S^rUOUS CH;•iPGES.

31?

IT'S THE SENTENCE OF THIS COURT THAT YOU SERVE TWO TERMS
OF FIVE YEARS TO LIFE AT THE UTAH STATE PRISON, ONE ON EACH
OF THE FIRST DEGREE FELONIES.

HOWEVEP, I WILL CRDER THAT

THEY RUN CONCURRENT WITH EACH OTHER AND WITH THE DAVIS COUNTY
FELONY.
MR. CAINS:

THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT:

AND I'M GOING TO ORDER THAT YOU PAY

RESTITUTION OF $801 ON THE ARBY'S CASS AND $299 PLUS TWO
HUNDRED AND —
MR. CAINS:

EIGHTY.

MR. PARMLEY:

—

EIGHTY DOLLARS IN RESTITUTION.

2 80 IS TO MRS. MAGUNE.

THAT

IN THE EVENT ANY OF THESE VICTIMS DO

ENGAGE IN COUNSELING, ALSO GOING TO ORDER THAT YOU PAY THEIR
COUNSELING COSTS EECAUSE YOU CAN WELL IMAGINE THAT THEY RAY
BE TERRORIZED EVEN TO LEAVE THEIR APARTMENTS NOW, SO —
THEIR HOMES BECAUSE OF YOUR MISCONDUCT.

OR

BUT THAT WILL BE

RESERVED FOR THE BOARD OF PARDONS TO DETERMINE IN THE EVENT
SOMETHING LIKE THAT HAPPENS.
I'M NOT GOING TO GIVE YOU NEW TIME -- CREDITS FOR TIME
SERVED OR GOOD TIME OBVIOUSLY IN THIS CASE.
MR. CAINS:
MR. EEL3ACH:

THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.
THANK YOU.

THAT'S ALL.

£ fZ.~s
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CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)
)
COUNTY OF WEBER)

S3

THIS I S TO CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING SEVEN PAGES OF
TRANSCRIPT CONSTITUTE A TRUE AND ACCURATE RECORD OF THE
PROCEEDINGS TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITY A3 A
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH.
DATED AT OGDEN,

UTAH THIS 17TH DAY OF JANUARY,

2007.

|J&V\(| Uf(
DEAN OLSEN,

CSR

r
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1
2

:N THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

3

IN AND FOR WEEER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF,
VS.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT

AARON LONNEL HELBACH,

PLEA

9
DEFENDANT.
10

CASE NOS. 0 3 1 9 0 1 4 1 1 ,
031901413

11

+ ****

12

HONORABLE ROGEP S. DUTSON

13

AUGUST 18, 2003

14
15
16

APPEARANCES

17

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

MS. BFENDA J. BEATON

18

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

MR. JOHN T. CAIKE

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

'•S> ^"XA f—:N'rv

031901412

LS jr itS4 J S^i

1

mi?£:

*&<*

P R 0 C E E D I N G S

2

T H E CLERK:

F o r t h e re cord, this is State of Utah

3

versus A a r o n L o n n e l H e l b a c h , case numbers 031901411,

4

031901 412, and 0 3 1 9 0 1 4 1 3 .

5

MR. C A I N S :

T ime set for di sposition.

T h i s is Aa ron HelbachL, Your Honor.

As

6

you re sail, this case h a d b e e n continued c ver a bit because

7

he had pled g u i l t y to a firs t degree felon y aggravated

8

robbery in Davis County and nad actually g one down on a

9

diagno stic w h i l e these c a s e s we re pending.

10

received the diagnostic.

11

to the five to life

12

We've now

He was sentenced by Judge Allphin

sentence •

Ba sed upon that, I've ta Iked with Mr. Farmley and we've

13

reache(d a negotiation; that is, that he wi 11 plead guilty to

14

two of the -- I think these are in separat e files, actually,

15

two fi rst degree felony aggr avated robberi es.

16

case - - the first one is the

17

is the case on the 14th of F ebruary 2003 Vt here the victim is

18

Arby's

19

listed as initial D. Kagoon, capital, M-A- S-O-C-N.

--

It's the

just so th at you have them --

And the second one is en 3/11/200 3, the victim is

20

In return for that, the third case wil 1 be dismissed.

21

And th e State -- we're going to ask to be sentenced today and

22

the St ate will recommend con current sentences as between the

23

rwo charges and with the Davis County case , and that's the

24
25

1

n e c o t iation.

THE COURT:

All rig ht.

Is there a written plea
r

4()1

3

agreement?

MR. CAINE:

The.re is.

THE COURT:

And you understand what's in there,

Mr. Helbach?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Wha-:'s your level of education?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yeah, I do.

Post high school tech school.

And you read and write and understand

well?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

Are you on any medications, alcohol,

drugs or do you have any mental health condition today that
would make it: so you don t fully understand what's happening?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

No, sir.

And are you satisfied with the legal

representation you've received?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

All right.

If you wish, you may go

ahead and sign that.

MR. CAINE:
affirm.

Actually, he signed it earlier, I can

We'].1 just a make a record, Your Honor.

Aaron, you and I reviewed this document and talked about
this and it bears your signature and you just signed it in
the lockup in there a mi:iUu6 ago; i s t n a t c c r r e ^ L ?

THE DEFENDANT:

I

Y e s, s i r.

302
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THE COURT:

r~ V

=

•+-

i"

.s your s.ignature?

2. " %,-X I <*£

*£2 Z'v?

And d o you

waiv e or giv e up your p r e l :.minary h-taring rights?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes,

sir.

You ur.derstand youTve had the right to

have pre limi:iary hea rings?
THE DE FEND ANT :
THE COURT:

Y e s, sir.

Okay.

So that we have everyth ing

stra ight L s r s .
MS. BEATON:

We dc/H' t have restitution det ermined is

one thin g. J-.nd I don't know whether or not the v i e tuns in
this case want to be heard given the nature of the fact that
it } s an aggr;avated r obbery.
THE COURT:

Right.

MS. BEATON:
TH3 COURT:

They may very well want: to be heard.
They vrery well might.

ther e we re t\tfo m v o lv m g

Let T s - - now

—

MR. CAINS:

Yeah.

THE COURT:

-- D. Magoon one on March the 5th and

One on -—

one on M arch the 11th.
MR. CAINE:

The or,e on March 11th is the one we're

goin g to plead t o .

14th OI

THE COURT:

All

MR. CAINS:

And th.en the Arby's case which is on the

r e^IT'v.i

n ght.

a r y.

THE CLERK:

Can we specify case numbers so I get the

303

THE COURT:
MS. 3EAT0N:

Yes, I will.
We'll be dismissing case ending in 1413

and the defendant will be pleading to case ending 1412 and
1411.
THE CLERK:

Thank you.

MR. CAINS:

That is correct.

THE COURT:

All right.

MR. CAINE:

As far as -- I guess we probably ought

Now —

to -- since this hasn't been raised before, as far as the
restitution goes since I don't —

at least Mr. Farmley didn't

indicate there had been any claim, I suppose what you can do
is leave that for the Board cf Pardons to determine.
THE COURT:

We can address that.

MR. CAINE:

Yeah.

THE COURT:

But first then, so that we're clear on

the elements under the most recent case from the Court of
Appeals, we have to be very detailed on the elements.

And

I'll go over those again which may be somewhat duplicating
what's in this written agreement but I want you to clearly
understand what you're pleading to, what the elements are,
and so I'm going to go over them witn some more detail.
I'll ask first on the case of February the 14th on case
number 1411, and that's the Arby's case, what would the
elements have been had you gone to trial on that?

6

MS. BEATON:
MR. CAINS:

Do you wa nt to state them?
This is

— theyTre all fairly simi lar.

This is a ca se, this is a situa tion where the defen dant wen w
in there r he indicat ed that he

ing to
and thatTs what h appe n e d.

get prop erty , money in this case,
THE COURT:

Did he obt ain property cr just att empt

to gain prop-srty at Arby's ?
MR. CAINE:

Yeah.

THE COURT:

Arby ! s he got some money or pr oper ty

He obtained the property.

from them th:reatenin g them with a weapon?
MR. CAINS : Money, yes
THE COURT:

All right.

Kagoon, what are the —
MR. CAINE :

And on the 11th cf Mar ch, D.

that says it was a knife.

This is a -- this is a —

indicate d theat he ha d done that
Sinclair gas station actually.

at 1 east he

This is the —

at a

The individual was :he person

named th ere iand ther e was a m d ication that he had s knife
and ther e wa.a money from there also.
THE COURT:

And you go t money then?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, s ir.

All right.

So these then woul c be the

elements tha-t yoi di d by use of force or fear a kni fe, and
then in the (ozher
you had

liO

ca se, a gun, steal money from per sons that

3ca1 rig ht to have.

JL*

trie elements p

And you understand the se are

|

S s~ * 2 . ' x 2!5t?3 ^ r t£lr»iBff

si r.

1

THE DEFENDANT:

2

THE COURT : All r i g h r .

Yes,

Ther to the A rby T s theft in

ca se number '.411, a robb ery, how do you plead?

3
4

THE DEFENDANT:

5

THE COURT:

Guilty.

And to the Sincl air robbe ry involving a

vi crim by the name of D. Magoon, how do you pi ead?

6
7

THE DEFENDANT:

8

THE COURT : Agg ravated robbe ry.

All right

And the factual basis has be en gi van tO th e Couru which

9

included these elem ents, and the refer e, the Co urt f inds there

10
11

Guilcy.

1

is

a factual basis upon which to ente r the pie as an d they are
You have up to the tim e of any sente ncing in which

12

en tered.

13

to attempt to withdraw your plea s in wri ring.

14

to have sentencing today apparen tly?

i r-

And you wish

10

MR. CAINE:

We do.

16

THE COURT:

You need to unde "V* Q ~~ and, K r. rie Ibach,

17

be fore we go ahead that ITm not bound1 by any r ecomm endations

IS

as to any penalties

19

the recommendations to run them concu rre nt and they could run

20

CO nsecutive

In other words, I don r t have 10 follow

to any other penalti es .

21

THE DEFENDANT:

22

THE COURT : All right.

23

I do underst and that, Your Honor.
You hav e the right ro come

ba ck after two days for sentenci ng and n o r m a l l y wit'nin 4 5
I

25

Do you un derst and -chat?

oa

ca_i_e ndar

permits to have sentencing.

And

no rmally I would re fer t ie matter to the Adult Prob arion

q

2*,/''f

Department for seme recommendation.

1
2

THE DEFENDANT:

3

MS. BEATON:

~" ,^3, %£%£&•

S" i $££

Z %^-^r «ril«i- •

Do you unders tand that?

Yes, sir.

Judge, the StateTs problem with doing

sentencing today is, one, restitution has not been

4

determined.

Two, the victims in these cases have not been

notified of the plea negotiation that was entered into, and
obviously, not have had an opportunity to let the Court know
what their fee^ngs are.
Although case number 1413 has been dismissed, that victim

9
10

is the victim on the first instance and the victim on the

11

second instance.

12

that indicates that she clearly has an opinion as to what

13

ought to happen in this case, and I just don't see how the

14

defendant is harmed in any fashion by waiting.

And she submitted a victim impac t statement

THE COURT:

15

All right.

I tend to agree, although I

16

do have a presentence report with the diagnostic e valuation

17

of some sorts.

13

diagnostic.

Actually, it's not a presentence, it's just a

MS. BEATON:

19

I don't think Mr. Parmley ha d

anticipated that sentencing would take place today

20

THE COURT:

21

I'm not —

I think it would b e better

22

for me to know what the facts are and whether the State

23

remains silent or not isn't the issue.

O /I

because of the seriousness of the offenses for pre sentence.

£~ -2

25

1

MR. CAINE:

Well, that —
.

okay.
2

I'm going to refer it
j

I'm goin g to now
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I1 m in a position - - n u m b e r o n e , let m e m a k e

j

record.

the

M r . Farmley did know it.
Number two, it m a k e s no sens e at all to h a v e a
pr esentence report.

You h a v e

what we were working on.

a diagnostic

I don ' t care if we cont inue it to

le t the vict im come in, tha t T s

a 11 r i g h t

with

is not a sit uation w h e r e th e S t a t e —

the

It makes

me.

report .

no sense at all to h a v e ano t h e r d i a g n o s t i c

--

State

he 's going t o prison, and t he St ate is m a k i n g
re commendation for a

and that's

report

And this
he knows

an

affirmative

it

ought to be.

concurrent sentence.

THE COURT:

Right.

MR. CAINS:

And

I think

that's

where

I don't have any pr oblem wi th gi v i n g a v i c t i m an opportunity
to speak, bu t the v ictim -- all the v i c t i m can as k for is a
pr ison sente nee, and that's all w e ' r e
THE COURT:

What

I Tm

doing.

go ing to do then

is

continue

th is to allow the t ime for the v ictims to come in and ask
that the pre sence r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s

that have

been

made in
1

Da vis County be pro v i d e d .
MR. CAINS:

That's

^•in^

I don't

have

any

problem

wi th that.
MS. BEATON :

W e l l , m a y b e if t h e y

can

det ermine

a

re stitution figure.
MR.

H7\ TVTT7 .

THE C O U R T :

j_ r we ve
If

we could

got

a rss L I L U L I O R

get a restitution figure,
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1

that would be helpf ul.

2

MR. CAINS:

That's fine.

3

THE COURT:

How long do you need?

4

got a holiday on oh e 1st.

5

really heavy on the 8th.

6

that's simply beoau se my calendar is so bad.

7

for you, fine; if not, let's talk
MR. CAINE:

3
9
10

Let's set it for the —

We've

and I'm

Let's set it for the 15th.

And

If that's good

—

The only problem with that day is --

well, I'm sure one of my colleges can be here.

I start a

jury trial here wit h -THE COURT:

11
12

Two weeks?

Would you be available on the 8th,

Mr. Caine?

13

MR. CAINE :

The 8th of September?

14

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

16

MR. CAINE:

Let's see.

Yes, I would.

17

THE COURT:

All right.

Let's set it for the 8th.

18

MR. CAINE:

All right.

19

THE COURT:

September the 8th then.

20

MR. CAINE:

That will be fine.

21

THE COURT:

All right.

15

22

but

It's getting to be quite heavy

—

Thank you.

All right.

(The matter concluded.)

23
i /i
^ -±

25
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H
State v. Helbach
Utah App.,2004.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK
COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Aaron L. HELBACH, Defendant and
Appellant.
No. 20040671-CA.
Oct. 28, 2004.
Second District, Ogden Department; The
Honorable Roger S. Dutson.
Aaron L. Helbach, Gunnison, Appellant
Pro Se.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Laura B. Dupaix, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges
ORME.

BENCH,

DAVIS,

guilty plea, giving the factual basis for his
plea and waiving specific rights, including
his right to appeal. The document also
specified that he could withdraw his plea
only on good cause shown, and that he must
file a motion to withdraw his plea before the
announcement of sentence. Helbach was
sentenced in September 2003.
[f3] In March 2004, Helbach filed a motion
for resentencing in the trial court in his
criminal case. Helbach asserted that he was
incompetent at the time of his plea, and thus
the plea was invalid. The trial court denied
the motion on its merits, finding there was
no indication that Helbach was not fully
capable of entering a knowing and voluntary
plea, and that the mental evaluation from the
State did not indicate any disorder that
would impact his competency. The trial
court also noted the motion was filed several
months after sentencing, but did " not
address [the] timeliness of the Motion."

and

MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For
Official Publication)
PER CURIAM:
ft[l]*l AaronHelbach appeals the trial
court's denial of his motion to be
resentenced. This is before the court on the
State's motion for summary disposition
based on lack of jurisdiction.
fl[2] Helbach pleaded guilty to a charge of
aggravated robbery in August 2003. Helbach
completed a statement in support of his

[^[4] Helbach asserts that his motion was
filed u under the philosophy" of State v.
Rees, 2003 UT App 4, 63 P.3d llOxert.
grantedJ i P.3d 946 (Utah 2003), which
permitted a defendant to file a motion for
resentencing in the sentencing court under
particular circumstances. Helbach has
apparently seized on Rees to avoid going
through the procedures for post-conviction
relief as set forth in the Utah PostConviction Remedies Act (Act), Utah Code
sections 78-35a-101 to -304 (2002), and
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C.
However, after Rees, this court has held that

© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Not Reported in P.3d

Page 2

Not Reported in P.3cL 2004 WL 2404373 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 388
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requests to be resentenced to permit a
renewal of an opportunity to appeal fall
squarely within rule 65C and the Act. See
State v Manning. 2004 LT App 87. c 21. 89
P.3d \96xert. grant ed,2004 Utah LEXIS
172(UtahAug. 11,2004).
[^f5] Additionally, Helbach has not shown
that he comes within the scope of Rees In
Rees, this court held that extraordinary relief
may be available in the sentencing court if a
defendant has been denied the effective
assistance of counsel on appeal. See Rees,
2003 UT App 4 at T 6. Such relief, however,
is available only in u limited circumstances,
to modify or vacate a judgment where extrarecord facts show that the defendant has
been deprived of his constitutional right to a
fair trial or meaningful appeal." Id at ^f
13.Helbach waived his right to a trial and
appeal by pleading guilty and does not come
within the narrow scope of Rees
[%6] Instead, Helbach's motion is governed
by Utah Code section 77-13-6, providing for
the methods of challenging a guilty plea.
Section 77-13-6 provides that a guilty plea "
may be withdrawn only upon leave of the
court and a showing that it was not
knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah
Code Ann. $ 77-13-6(7 )f a) (2003). A
request to withdraw a plea ** shall be made
by motion before sentence is announced."
IJ_ § 77-13-6(2)(b). If a defendant does not
timely request to withdraw his plea, any
challenge to the plea must be made pursuant
to rule 65C and the Act. See [d_ § 77-136(2)(c).

The trial court also noted, but did not rule
on, the late filing of the motion. In
substance, Helbach's motion was a motion to
withdraw his plea, and the trial court
considered it as such. However, under
section 77-13-6, the trial court had no
jurisdiction to consider the motion because it
was made months after sentence was
announced. Section 77-13-6 limits a
defendant's right to withdraw a guilty plea to
the time before the announcement of
sentence. See id_ § 77-13-6(2)(b). "
Thereafter, the right is extinguished." State
v. Abeyta, 852 P2d 993. 995 (Utah 1993)
(holding that failure to file a timely motion
for withdrawal extinguishes the right). The
timely filing of a notice to withdraw a plea
is jurisdictional. See State v. Reyes, 2002 UT
13>13-4,40P.3d630.
[^|8] The trial court lacked jurisdiction over
Helbach's motion, and thus this court
likewise lacks jurisdiction over this appeal.
See State v Mont ova, 825 P.2d 676. 678-79
(Utah Ct.App.lQ91). Accordingly, this
appeal is dismissed.
Utah App..2004.
State v. Helbach
Not Reported in P.3d, 2004 WL 2404373
(Utah App.), 2004 UT App 388
END OF DOCUMENT

fl[7] *2 Helbach's motion requested
resentencing, but attacked the validity of his
plea, arguing he was incompetent. The trial
court addressed the merits, finding that
Helbach was not incompetent at his plea.
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Helbach v. Dutson
Utah App.,2004.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK
COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Aaron L. HELBACH, Petitioner,
v.
Judge Roger DUTSON, Mark DeCaria, and
State of Utah, Respondents.
No. 20040947-CA.
Dec. 16,2004.
Original Proceeding in this Court.
Aaron L. Helbach, Gunnison, Petitioner
Pro Se.
Brent M. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for
Respondent Judge Dutson.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Christopher D.
Ballard, Salt Lake City, for Respondent
State of Utah.
Before Judges BILLINGS, BENCH, and
GREENWOOD.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For
Official Publication)
PER CURIAM:
[f 1] *1 Aaron Helbach filed a petition in the
appellate courts seeking extraordinary relief
under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 19
and seeking habeas corpus relief under Utah
Rule of Appellate Procedure 20.
fl[2] Helbach's petition challenges the
validity of his guilty plea to charges of

aggravated robbery. Helbach pleaded guilty
in August 2003 and was sentenced in
September 2003. He did not file a timely
motion to withdraw his plea. SeeUtah Code
Ann. $ 77-13-6(2)(b) (2003) (providing a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea must be
made before sentence is announced). As a
result, his sole avenue to challenge his plea
is under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act
(Act), seeUtah Code sections 78-35a-101 to
-110, and rule 65C of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. SeeUtah Code Ami. $ 7713-6(2)(c).
HJ3] Under rule 19 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, a petition for
extraordinary relief in an appellate court is
available only where " no other plain,
speedy, or adequate remedy exists." Utah
RApp. P. 19(b)(4); see alsoUtah R. Civ. P.
65B. Helbach has a plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy to challenge his plea under
the procedures of the Act and rule 65C.
Thus, to the extent Helbach's petition is a
petition for extraordinary relief under rule
19, it is denied.
[f4] Rule 20 provides that where a petition
for habeas corpus relief is filed in an
appellate court, the petition " will be
referred to the appropriate district court."
Utah R.App. P. 20(a). The referral is
required u unless it is shown on the face of
the petition to the satisfaction of the
appellate court that the district court is
unavailable or other exigent circumstances
exist." Id. Helbach's petition does not
address this requirement at all. He alleges no

© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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(Cite as: Not Reported in P.3d)
facts that would show the una\ ailability of
the district court or other exigent
circumstances warranting the retention of
the petition in an appellate court. As a result,
insofar as the petition is a petition for habeas
corpus or post-conviction relief, the petition
is not appropriately before this court.
[Tf5] Accordingly,
the petition for
extraordinary relief is denied. Further, the
petition is referred to the second district
court for consideration regarding the claims
for post-conviction relief.

Utah App..2004.
Helbach v. Dutson
Not Reported in P.3d, 2004 WL 2903877
(Utah App.), 2004 UT App 480
END OF DOCUMENT
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 83G4TP QF J J X A ^ .
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT
"•-"wL-i

^
L,LUn]

AARON HELBACH,
RULING AND ORDER
Petitioner,
Case No. 631901411 r S

vs.

Honorable Ro?er S. Dutson
STATE OF UTAH,

MAY 1 8 2006
Respondent.

When the Petitioner filed a petition challenging the validity of his guilty plea, this Court
summarily dismissed it after a review of the record showed that the Petitioner's claims were
w ithout merit. Subsequently, the Petitioner asked for reconsideration arguing that the law does
not allow a review of the record or the merits of a petitioner's claims at this stage of the
proceedings. Because the Court finds that the Petitioner's arguments are valid, the previous
order dismissing the petition is vacated.
Upon receiving a petition for post conviction relief, a court must summarily dismiss
claims when, based solely on the pleading's allegations, it appears that the facts alleged do not
support a claim for relief as a matter of law. or that the claim has no arguable basis in fact. Utah
R. Civ. P. 65C(g). The court will review only the information contained in this petition.
I. Elements of Aggravated Robbery
The Petitioner alleges that he was not told that the elements of aggravated robbery
included: (1) a taking, (2) of personal property, (3) from a person or in his immediate presence,
Ruling and Order
Helbach \ s. State
Case No. 031901411 FS
Pase 1 of 16

Ruling and Order

060900429

VD19024645
STATE OF UTAH

9f\n

and (4) a positive identification by the victim. A defendant must be informed of the elements of
the charge before a court ma}' accept a guilty plea. State v. Merrill 114 P.3d 585. 592 (Utah
2005). The aggravated robbery statute in effect at the time the Petitioner committed the crime
states that "[a] person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he . . .
uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601. . . ." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-301 (2003). The robbery statute states that, "[a] person commits robbery if. . . the
person unlawfully and intentionalh takes or attempts to take personal property in the possession
of another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or
fear. . . /" Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003). Clearly, the statute includes the elements of (1) a
taking. (2) of personal property. (3) from a person or in his immediate presence, so the
Petitioner's claim that his plea was not voluntary because he was not advised of these elements,
is not facially frivolous. That issue will be forwarded to the Utah State Attorney General's
Office for review. However, a positive identification by a victim, is not an element of aggravated
robbery, so this claim is summarily dismissed as facially frivolous.
II. How the Facts Constitute The Crime
The Petitioner alleges that he was not told how the facts of his case constitute the crime
charged. "Because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge,
it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in
relation to the facts." State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah 1984). The Petitioner has
at least stated a possible cause of action, so that issue will be forwarded to the Attorney General's
Office for review.
III. Bifurcated Procedure
Ruling and Order
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The Petitioner asserts that his plea was not knowing, because no one explained that
pro\ ing aggravated robbery was a bifurcated procedure requiring proof of robbery before
aggravated robbery. He states that had he known that the Prosecutor had to prove that he took
personal property from a person by means of force or fear, he would not have entered into a
guilt) plea, because these elements require some proof that he was at the scene. It is not clear
which of the following three probable claims the Petitioner is making.
If the Petitioner means to state a claim that his plea was unknowing, because he did not
know that a conviction for an aggravated crime is done in a bifurcated procedure, he has stated a
facially frivolous claim. The Petitioner has not provided, and the Court has not found, any
support for this proposition, and the Court concludes that this information is not required. The
Court finds support for its conclusion in State v. Corwell 114 P.3d 569 (Utah 2005). In Corwell
the defendant argued that the court's duty under Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(Rule 11(e)) to advise her that her right to appeal wras limited, meant that the court must explain
numerous appeal issues. The Supreme Court of Utah observed that nothing in the plain language
of Rule 11(e) required such a detailed explanation. The Supreme Court also referenced. State v.
Visser. 22 P.3d 1242 (Utah 2000), where it held that a trial court was not required to explain
e\ ery aspect of the right to a speedy trial. Consequent!}, the Supreme Court held that a
defendant was not entitled to an explanation of every aspect of the right to appeal. The Court
concludes that requiring a trial court to explain the bifurcated procedure used in a conviction for
an aggravated offense is tantamount to requiring a court to provide a detailed explanation of
appellate issues. Therefore, the Court summaril) dismisses this claim.
The second possible claim the Petitioner could be making is that he v,as not ad^ ised of
Ruling and Order
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every element of the crime. This claim echos the Petitioner's first claim, but it alleges that none
of the elements were explained. This claim will be forwarded to the Utah State Attorney
General's Office.
The third possible claim the Petitioner could be making is that his plea was unknowing,
because he was not advised that the State must prove every element of the crime. As stated
before, a defendant must be ad\ ised of the consequences of his guilty plea. .See, State v. Merrill
114 P.3d 585, 592 (Utah 2005). Therefore, this claim will be forwarded to the Office of the Utah
State Attorney General for review.
IV. Ability to Withdraw Guilty Plea and the Right to Appeal
The Petitioner has included two different paragraphs which contain contradictory
statements regarding whether the Court made mistakes when advising him about Ins right to
appeal and his right to withdraw his guilty plea. In his second paragraph he states Jhat he was
never advised of his right to withdraw his guilty plea or his right to appeal. However, in his first
paragraph, he states that the plea agreement incorrectly advised him that he had thirty days from
the entry of a plea to withdraw his plea. Further, the Petitioner argues that the law allows the
withdrawal of a guilty plea upon a showing of good cause or exceptional circumstances, or by
using a petition for post conviction relief. Finally, the Petitioner states that he would like to
assert his right to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Rule 11(f).
The failure to inform a defendant of the right to appeal can constitute a denial of the right
to appeal. See, Manning v. State, 122 P.3d 628, 636 (Utah 2005). Therefore, the Petitioner has
stated a claim for relief, and the Court will forward this claim to the Attorney General's Office
for review.
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Before addressing the Petitioner's claims related to his ability to withdraw a guilty plea,
the Court notes that withdrawal of a guilty plea is not a right. State v. Dean, 95 P.3d 276, 280
(Utah 2004). To the extent that the Petitioner means to assert a claim that his right to withdraw
his guilty plea was violated, he has stated a facially frivolous claim which is summarily
dismissed. The Court will address the Petitioner's arguments assuming that he means to assert a
claim that he was not advised of his ability to seek withdrawal of his guilty plea.
If the Petitioner is claiming that he never was informed of his ability to withdraw his
guilty plea, he has stated facially frivolous claim. To state a claim in a petition for post
conviction relief, the basis for that relief must be one, such as a constitutional violation, listed in
the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA). Pleading a violation of one of the prophylactic
provisions of Rule 11(e) is insufficient. Salazar v. Utah State Prison, 852 P.2d 988 (Utah 1993).
The only possible constitutional violation implicated by this issue is whether the failure to advise
the defendant of the ability to withdraw a guilty plea renders the plea unknowing or involuntary.
The Petitioner has not provided, and the Court's review of many cases, has not revealed any
support for such an assertion. Two case which addresses this issue suggest to the contrary. In
State v. Dean, 95 P.3d 276, 280 (Utah 2004), the Supreme Court of Utah stated that withdrawal
o[ a guilty plea is not a right, it is a privilege which may be granted upon a show ing of good
cause In State v. Merrill 114 P.3d 585 (Utah 2005). the Supreme Court of Utah stated that the
right to seek withdrawal of a guilty plea is not subject to constitutional protections. Because
withdrawal of a guilty plea is not a right, it is unlikely that the failure to advise a defendant that
he can seek withdrawal of his guilty plea renders the plea unknowing. Further, Rule 11(f) states
the failure to ad\ ise a defendant of the time limits in which he may make a motion to withdraw a
Ruling and Order
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guilt} plea, is not a basis to set the plea aside. Given the lack of support for the Petitioner's
position, and the strongly suggesth e language in the cases and Rule 11(f). the Court concludes
that a defendant does not have the constitutional right to be advised of his ability to pursue the
withdrawal of his guilty plea. Therefore, this claim is summarily dismissed.
If the Petitioner is claiming that his guilty plea should be vacated, because he was
incorrectly told of the time limits for withdrawing his guilt} plea under State \ Ostler. 31 P.3d
528 (Utah 2001), his claim is facially frivolous. Ostler interpreted a statute which allowed a
defendant to withdraw his guilty plea up to thirty days after its entry. Since Ostler, this time limit
has been changed. This amendment w7as in effect when the Petitioner committed the crimes and
entered his plea. Therefore, the Court summarily dismisses this claim.
Petitioner also claims that any statement which gives a time limit for withdrawing a guilty
plea is an incorrect statement of the law7. The Petitioner cites to State v Marvin, 964 P 2d 313,
318 (Utah 1998) to demonstrate that a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea upon a showing of
good cause or exceptional circumstances. He also notes that withdrawal can be done by using a
petition for post com iction relief. If this is a separate claim for relief, it repeats the Petitioner's
claim that he was incorrectly advised of the time limits to withdraw his guilt} plea. Therefore, it
is summarily dismissed as faciall} frholous.
The final issue in this claim, is whether the Petitioner may assert his "right"' under Rule
11 (f) to make a motion to set aside his guilty plea, because he was incorrectly informed about the
time limits for making such a motion. However, the Petitioner has not submitted a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. Therefore, the Court dismisses this claim as frholous.
V. Conditional Guilty Pleas and Incompetency
Ruling and Order
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The Petitioner's next claim is also unclear. He firsts states that his plea was unknowing,
because he was not advised of his right to enter into a conditional guilty plea. Then, he makes
multiple allegations regarding his competency. First, he was evaluated for mental incompetency
after a conviction in Davis County but before his guilty plea in Weber. Second, the evaluation
stated that he did not suffer from any serious mental disorder at that time. Third, he was not
competent to make a confession. Fourth, when his lawyer saw the report, he incorrectly advised
him to plead guilty, because the Petitioner had confessed. The Petitioner claims this advise was
unsound, because his attorney should have been looking at his competency at the time he
confessed. Fifth, the Petitioner alleges that the Court made several procedural errors in assessing
his competency, because (1) the Court did not order another evaluation by the Department of
Human Sendees which the Petitioner claims is required by 77-15 et. seq.; and (2) the Court
incorrectly stated that he was competent without ever holding a hearing or getting an evaluation
by mental experts: and (3) the Court was incorrect in its assessment of competency, because his
mental disorder was worse than in several other cases which the Petitioner cites; and finally, the
petitioner alleges that he did not know what was going on in the courtroom, because he suffers
from bipolar disorder.
The Petitioner could be making several possible claims: (1) the Petitioner was entitled to
be adA ised of the right to enter a conditional guilty plea (he would have used that right to exclude
his confession and contest his competency to stand trial); (2) his plea was unknowing, because he
was not advised of his right to enter a conditional guilty plea; (3) he was incompetent at the time
he confessed, so using his confession to obtain a guilty plea is illegal (this claim was made in this
petition); (4) the Petitioner was incompetent at the time he entered a guilty plea, so his guilty plea
Ruling and Order
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was unknowing; or (5) the Petitioner was too incompetent to enter an} type of plea (this claim
was made in this petition). Again, the Court will address each possibility in turn.
The first two of these possible claims are based on the incorrect assumption that a
defendant has the right to be informed of the ability to enter a conditional guilty plea and/or he
had the right to enter a conditional guilty plea. Based on the following analysis, the Court
dismisses the first two possible claims as facially frivolous.
The Petitioner has not provided, and the Court cannot find, any support for the
proposition that a defendant has the right to be informed of the ability to enter a conditional
guilt)7 plea, and the Court concludes that it is not required to inform a defendant of this option.
The purpose of Rule 11(e). which lists the rights of which a defendant must be informed, is to
ensure that a defendant's plea is voluntary and hwMing. See, State v Gamblin, 1 P.3d 1108,
1111 (Utah 2000) (emphasis added). The ability of a defendant to enter a conditional guilty plea
is not one of these rights listed in rule 1 l(e)-it is listed in Rule 1 l(i). Therefore, the Court
concludes that it is not required to advise a defendant of the possibility of entering a conditional
plea, before a defendant's plea can be characterized as voluntary.
Also, the Court concludes that the Petitioner does not have the right to enter such a plea.
Rule 1 l(i), which lists the conditions under which a court may accept a conditional guilty plea,
states that a defendant can only enter a conditional guilty plea if the prosecutor consents, and the
court approves. The plain language of Rule 1 l(i) demonstrates that the ability to enter a
conditional guilty plea is a privilege-not a right. This conclusion is supported by State v
Gamblin, 1 P.3d 1108 (Utah 2000). In Gamblin, the Supreme Court of Utah concluded that
withdrawal of a guilty plea was a privilege not a right, because the plain language of the statute
Ruling and Order
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stated that withdrawal was conditioned on court approval. The rule allowing the entry of a
conditional guilty plea, also conditions this ability on court approval. Therefore, the Court
concludes that the ability to enter a conditional guilty plea is not a right.
The Petitioner's next possible claim is that he was incompetent when he gave his
confession, so it should have been excluded. The Petitioner apparently presumes that exclusion
of the confession would mean that it could not be used by his attorney to encourage him to plead
guilty or by the prosecution as a basis for the guilty plea. "[B]y pleading guilty, the defendant. .
.waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations/' State
v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989). Whether a confession can be used due to a
defendant's incompetency is a pre-plea constitutional issue. Therefore, this claim is frivolous
and summarily dismissed.
The Petitioner's claim, that his attorney should not have considered his confession when
recommending the plea bargain, is one for ineffective assistance of counsel. To succeed in an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must at least allege that counsel's
performance fell below professionally competent assistance, and but for counsel's deficient
performance, there is a reasonable probability that the proceeding's results would have been
different. Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 690-694 (1984). While the Petitioner failed
to allege prejudice, the Petitioner's claim is sufficient for the review of the Attorney General.
Finally, the Petitioner claims that the prosecutor established a basis for his guilty plea by
inappropriately using evidence obtained by engaging in unconstitutional behavior. The Petitioner
did not provide, and the Court's review of many cases did not reveal, any support for his
assertion. Therefore, the Court summarily dismisses this claim as frivolous.
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The last of the Petitioner's possible claims allege that he was incompetent at the time he
was entered his guilty plea. "It is well established that due process requires that a defendant be
mentally competent to plead guilt} and to stand trial/' State v. Arguelles. 63 P.3d 73 L 745 (Utah
2003). Because the Petitioner made allegations which facially support these last claims for relief,
the Court wall forward both of them to the Attorney General's Office for response.
As part of these claims the Court wall forward the Petitioner's claims that the Court did
not correctly follow the procedure to establish whether the Petitioner wras competent-including
the Petitioner's claims that the Court decided competency without a hearing or getting an
e\ aiuation completed by mental experts. However,-the Court wall not address the Petitioner's
claim that he had the right to have his competency evaluated by the Department of Human
Services (DHS) as stated in 77-15, et. seq., because (1) the Petitioner had undergone a recent
DHS e^ aiuation which was provided to this Court and (2) the Petitioner did not have this right.
The on!) reference to DHS performing a competency e\ aiuation in the statutes cited by the
Petitioner is in 77-15-5(2)(a) which states;fcw[a]fterthe granting of a petition and prior to a full
competency hearing, the court may order the Department of Human Sendees to examine the
person and to report to the court concerning the defendant's mental condition. Utah Code Ann.
77-15-5(2)(a) (emphasis added). Because an evaluation by DHS is discretionary, die Court is not
required to pro\ ide an additional evaluation The Court dismisses this part of the Petitioner's
claim as facially frh olous.
VI. Explanation of Possible Punishments for the Charged Crime
The Petitioner also claims that his plea wras unknowing, because he did not receive an
adequate explanation of the punishment which would be imposed. The Petitioner states that: (1)
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the Court did not explain that he would have to be in prison for at least five years before he
would be eligible for parole: (2) the Court did not explain that he could be imprisoned for life;
(3) the Court did not explain that the matrix calculation in the pre-sentencing investigation report
(PSI) was not binding; and (4) the Court did not explain that it relinquished jurisdiction to the
Board of Pardons and Parole after sentencing. Due process requires that a court explain the
consequences of a guilty plea. .See, State v. Merrill 114 P.3d 585, 592 (Utah 2005). A Court
must explain the minium and maximum punishment for a crime when taking a guilty plea, so the
Court will forward the first two claims to the Utah State Attorney Generals office for response.
However, the Court has no obligation to discuss the PSI matrix as that is only advisory to the
Court, and the Court need not explain that it relinquishes jurisdiction to the Board of Pardons
and Parole as that is done by statute. These later two claims are dismissed as facially frivolous.
VII. Rights Which Are Waived Upon Pleading Guilty
Nexlt the Petitioner states that the Court failed to ensure that he understood all of the
rights he was waiving. However, the Petitioner does not state of which right the Court did not
advise him. Because, this mere allegation is not enough to state a claim, the Court summarily
dismisses this claim as frivolous on its face.
VIII. Strict Compliance With Rule 11(e)
Next, die Petitioner states that the Court failed to strictly comply with Rule 11(e) when
taking his guilty plea. The Petitioner does not state whether this allegation is a claim or is a
factual allegation to support his claim that his plea was not voluntaiy and knowing. The failure
to strictly comply with Rule 11(e) is not a basis to vacate a plea pursuant to a petition for postconviction relief. See, Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 992 (Utah 1993)(a petitioner must
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show a violation of his constitutional rights which made his/her plea unknowing or involuntary).
However, the Petitioner has alleged facts important enough to forward this claim to the Attorney
General for review.
IX. Evidence Supporting the Charge of Aggravated Robbery
The Petitioner attacks the evidence in his case by making the following claims: (1) intent
wras not proven; (2) there was no evidence that he committed the crime; (3) his co-defendants had
motive to implicate him: and (4) his confession was incompetent "[B]y pleading guilty, the
defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the essential elements of the crime charged . . . /'
State v. Parsons. 781 P.2d 1275. 1278 (Utah 1989). The Petitioner waived his right to require the
state to prove all of the elements of aggravated robbery when he entered a guilty plea. Therefoie,
the Court summarily dismisses this claim as facially frivolous.
X. Insufficient Factual Basis to Support the Petitioner's Guilty Plea
The Petitioner claims that the insufficient factual basis provided for his guilt} plea
violated his due process rights and the prosecutor's ethical duty. A violation of a prosecutor's
ethical duty is an insufficient allegation to support a motion to vacate a guilty plea Therefore,
this claim is summarily dismissed. However, failing to make a record of facts sufficient to
support a guilty plea is a violation of a defendant's due process rights. Willett v. Barnes. 842
P.2d 860. 862 (Utah 1992). Therefore, the Petitioner's claim is facially sufficient so it will be
forwarded to the Utah State Attorney General's Office for evaluation.
XI. Inaccuracies Contained in the Pre-Sentencing Investigation Report
The Petitioner also contends that he was unable to contest inaccuracies in his Presentencing Investigation Report (PSI), because he never received a cop)7. Due process requires
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that a defendant be provided with information being relied on by the Court for sentencing. State
v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005 (Utah 1982). Therefore, the Petitioner has stated a facially sufficient
claim for relief and the Court will forward it to the Office of the Attorney General.
XII. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The Petitioner claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel, listing approximately
25 reasons why his attorney's performance was deficient. To succeed on a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel, a petitioner must allege that counsel's performance fell below
professional!} competent assistance, and but for counsel's deficient performance, there is a
reasonable probability that the proceeding's results would have been different. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-694 (1984). Although the Petitioner failed to allege how these
deficiencies prejudiced him, it is an issue sufficient to refer to the Attorney General for response.
XIIL Sufficiency of the Evidence and Vagueness
The Petitioner alleges that the behavior of which he is accused does not satisfy the
elements of the aggravated robbery statute. First, the statute requires an intentional taking. The
Petitioner asserts that this element requires proof of his identity-something which did not happen
in this case. Second, the Petitioner states that robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of
personal property from their person or in his immediate presence by means of force or fear. The
Petitioner references Black's Law Dictionary to show that the definition of'"personal" means
"pertaining to and limited to a person/' The Petitioner uses his version of the robbery statute and
his definition of'"personaP to argue that the statute requires that the property which is taken,
must be taken from the person who owns it. Since the property taken, in the robberies of which
the Petitioner was convicted was owned by the store (not b) the employees from whom it was
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taken), the Petitioner argues that he is not guilty. Finally, the Petitioner, in an implicit
acknowledgment that his argument hinges on his definition of personal, states that if someone
can provide a different definition of "personal," the statute is unconstitutionally \ague.
The Petitioner's claim that his guilty plea should be \ acated, because the Slate did not
provide proof of his identity is facially frivolous.

tfc

[B]y pleading guilt}*, the defendant is deemed

to ha\ e admitted all of the essential elements of the crime charged. . . ."' State v Parsons. 781
P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989). When the Petitioner pleaded guilty, he admitted all essential
elements of the crime. Therefore, this claim is summarily dismissed.
The Petitioner's argument that the property taken must be owned by the person from
whom it is taken is facially frivolous. The robbeiy statute in effect at the time of the Petitioner's
conviction reads, "[a] person commits robbeiy if. . . the person unlawfully and intentionally
takes or attempts to take personal propert) in the possession of another from his person, or
immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302
(2003). The statute clearly outlaws the taking of personal propeity (propeity owned b} a person)
from a person who has possession of it. Therefore, the Petitioner's claim is summarily
dismissed. Because the Court was able to resolve the Petitioner's claim without providing a
different definition of "personal property,'* the Court will not address the Petitioner's
constitutional vagueness argument.
ORDER
The following claims of the Petitioner are dismissed as facially frivolous.
1- There was no positive identification of the Petitioner by a victim as the statute requires.
2- The Petitioner wTas not advised of the bifurcated procedure used in aggravated crimes.
3- The Petitioner was denied his right to withdraw his guilty plea.
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4- The Petitioner was never informed of his ability to withdraw his guilty plea.
5- The Petitioner was incorrectly told of the time limits for withdrawing his guilty plea.
6- A guilt}7 plea may be withdrawn upon a showing of good cause or plain error or by a
petition for post conviction relief.
7- The Petitioner's should have been told of his right to enter a conditional guilty plea.
8- The Petitioner's plea was unknowing, because he was not advised of his right to enter a
conditional guilty plea.
9- The Petitioner's confession should have been excluded, because he was incompetent.
10- The Prosecutor violated the Petitioner's rights when he/she used the Petitioner's
confession, obtained in violation of the constitutional as a factual basis for the guilty
plea.
11 - The Court should have ordered an evaluation by the Department of Human Services.
12-The Court did not explain that the matrix calculation in the pre-sentencing
investigation report was not binding
13-The Court did not explain it relinquishes jurisdiction to the Board of Pardons and
Parole after sentencing.
14- The Court did not inform the Petitioner of all of the rights which he was waiving.
15- The evidence is insufficient to prove every element of aggravated robbery including
intent.
16- The prosecutor violated his/her ethical duty to insure that there was sufficient
evidence to charge the Petitioner with aggravated robbery.
17- The Prosecutor did not establish an intentional taking or a positive identification of
the Petitioner.
18- The aggravated robbery statute requires proof that the property, taken during the
robber}', was owned by the person from whom it was taken.
The following claims by the Petitioner are not facially frivolous.
1- The Petitioner was not told that the elements of aggravated robbery include a taking, of
personal property, from a person or in his immediate presence.
2- The Petitioner's plea was not informed of how the law related to the facts.
3-The Petitioner was not advised of every element of the crime.
4- The Petitioner was not advised that the State had the burden of proving every element
of the crime.
5- The Petitioner was not informed of the right to appeal.
6- The Petitioner's attorney should not have considered his confession in deciding to
recommend that the Petitioner plead guilty.
7- The Petitioner's guilty plea was unknowing, because was incompetent at the time he
entered the guilty plea.
8- The Petitioner was so incompetent, he was not able to enter any type of plea.
9- The Court incorrectly determined competency.
10- The Court did not correctly follow the procedure to establish whether the Petitioner
was competent when it did not hold a hearing or obtain evaluations from mental experts.
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PER CURIAM:
[^jl] *1 Aaron L. Helbach appeals the denial
of post-conviction relief from his conviction
of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony.
Helbach claims the post-conviction court
erred by denying his claim that the district
court should have sua sponte ordered a
competency evaluation before accepting the
plea. In the absence of a competency
petition, " [a] trial court must hold a

competency hearing when there is ' a
substantial question of possible doubt as to a
defendant's competency at the time of the
guilty plea.' " Stale v. Arzaelles, 2003 UT
1^ 49. 63 P.3d 731 (citation omitted). " In
determining whether a defendant is
competent to plead guilty, the trial court
must consider whether the defendant has
sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding and has a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings
against him." State v. Holland 921 P.2d
430.433 (Utah 1996). Thus, " [t]he fact that
a person is mentally ill, displays bizarre,
volatile, and irrational behavior, or has a
history of mental illness, does not mean that
he or she is incompetent to stand trial."
Jacobs v State, 2001 UT 17^ 16. 20 P.3d
382. In determining whether the trial court
erred by not holding a competency hearing,
a reviewing court considers the facts that
were before the trial court when the plea was
entered. See id. at 1[ 18.
fl[2] Helbach had the burden to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that a
substantial question of possible doubt as to
his competency existed at the time he
pleaded guilty. He attached two exhibits to
the post-conviction petition. The first was a
military evaluation, prepared in 2001, and
the second was a diagnostic evaluation,
prepared on June 18, 2003, for use in
sentencing in his criminal case. The military
evaluation assessed Helbach's mental health,
not his competency, and predated his guilty
plea by two years. The diagnostic evaluation
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also
assessed
mental
health.
not
competency, and was prepared two months
after the guilty plea. Nothing appearing in
the district court record or at the change-ofplea hearing would have created a
substantial question of possible doubt about
Helbach's competency. Helbach responded
appropriately to the court's questions,
affirmed his understanding of the written
plea agreement, and acknowledged that he
was knowingly and voluntarily pleading
guilty. He advised his attorney of a possible
additional charge, allowing counsel to obtain
an agreement that the guilty plea could be
withdrawn if the State filed the additional
charge. Ihe post-conviction court correctly
determined that the facts before the district
court at the time of the change of plea did
not give rise to a substantial question of
possible doubt about Helbach's competency.
fl[3] Helbach's claim that his guilty plea was
taken in violation of rule 11 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure is inadequately
briefed and without merit. A rule 11
violation, standing alone, is not sufficient to
support post-conviction relief, and a
petitioner must demonstrate that his guilty
plea w7as not knowing and voluntary. See
Salazar v Warden, 852 P.2d 988. 992 (Utah
1993). In advance of his guilty plea,
Helbach executed a detailed statement,
which stated the elements of the offense, the
factual basis for the guilty plea, the possible
sentences, the rights being waived, and the
time limit for moving to withdraw a guilty
plea. The district court conducted a plea
colloquy and also confirmed that Helbach
had read the statement and discussed it with
counsel. The post-conviction court did not
err in determining that Helbach's plea was
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and in
denying relief based upon alleged rule 11
violations.

fl[4] *2 Helbach next claims that the postconviction court erred by denying relief
based upon allegedly inappropriate police
action resulting in a coerced confession and
Miranda violations. A defendant who pleads
guilty u is deemed to have admitted all of
the essential elements of the crime charged
and thereby waives all nonjurisdictional
defects,
including
alleged
pre-plea
constitutional violations." State v Parsons,
781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989); see also
State v. Hardv, 2002 UT App 2445 13. 54
P.3d 645. Having concluded that the postconviction court did not err in determining
that Helbach's guilty plea was knowing and
voluntary, we do not consider these claims
further.
[1*5] Helbach also claims that the postconviction court erred in denying relief
based upon alleged ineffectiveness of trial
counsel. To prevail, Helbach must
demonstrate both that trial counsel's
performance was deficient, cind that the
deficient performance resulted in prejudice.
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984). Helbach contends that his trial
counsel was ineffective by failing to move
to withdraw the guilty plea based upon the
evidence of mental illness contained in the
2001 military evaluation or the 2003
diagnostic evaluation prepared between the
time of the plea hearing and sentencing.
Neither
evaluation
addressed
his
competency to enter a guilty plea. The State
correctly notes that the diagnostic report
found no thought disorder or serious mental
illness. Helbach did not present sufficient
proof to the post-conviction court that his
trial counsel was deficient in failing to move
to withdraw the guilty plea, and that court
did not err in denying relief.
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[%6] The remaining claims of ineffectiveness
of trial counsel are both conclusory and
inadequately briefed. Rule 24(a)(9) of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure'6 requires
not just bald citation to authority but
development of that authority and reasoned
analysis based on that authority." State v.
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). An
issue is inadequately briefed u when the
overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as
to shift the burden of research and argument
to the reviewing court." Id. We also reject
Helbach's apparent challenge to rule 65C of
the Utah Rules of Chil Procedure and his
claim of u structural defect" as inadequately
briefed. Accordingly, we do not consider
these claims on the merits.
[117] We affirm the denial of post-conviction
relief.
RUSSELL W. BENCH, Presiding Judge and
CAROLYN B. McHUGH and WILLIAM
A. THORNE JR., Judges, Concur.
UtahApp.,2007.
Helbach v. State
Not Reported in P.3d; 2007 WL 1576395
(Utah App.), 2007 UT App 191
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This case was not selected for
publication in the Federal Reporter.
Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter. See Fed. Rule of Appellate Procedure
32.1 generally governing citation of judicial
decisions issued on or after Jan. 1. 2007. See
also Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. (Find CTA10
Rule 32.1)
United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.
UNITED STATES of America, PlaintiffAppellee,
v.
Ira Lee WILKINS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 04-5189.
Dec. 13,2005.
Background: After defendant was indicted
for conspiracy and access device fraud, he
moved to suppress any statements obtained
during interrogation on the grounds that he
was not properly given his Miranda warnings. After a hearing, The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma denied the motion, finding that
Miranda warnings were given. Defendant
then pled guilty, but appealed district court's
denial of his motion to suppress.

Holding: The Court of Appeals, Ebel, J.5
held that defendant was precluded from raising arguments related to his statements made
during interrogation because he had entered
into unconditional guilty plea after he had
made the statements.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes

Criminal Law 110

€^=> 1026.10(4)

110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(D) Right of Review
110kl025 Right of Defendant to
Review
110kl026.10 Waiver or Loss
of Right
11 Old 026.10(2) Plea of
Guilty or Nolo Contendere
110kl026.10(4) k. Issues Considered. Most Cited Cases
Defendant was precluded from raising various arguments challenging federal district
court's denial of his motion to suppress his
confessions, where defendant entered an unconditional plea of guilty, which precluded
him from thereafter raising independent
claims relating to the alleged deprivation of
constitutional rights that occurred prior to
entry of the guilty plea.
*142 Usan K. Morgan, Philip E. Pinnell
Asst. U.S. Attorney, Office of the United
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States Attorney, Tulsa, OK. for PlaintiffAppellee.
Ste\en M. Hightower, Tulsa, OK, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before EBTL, McKAY and HFNRY, Circuit Judges.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT^
FN* After examining the briefs and
appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the
parties' request for a decision on the
briefs without oral argument. See
Fed. R.App. P. 34(f) amTlOth Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This Order and Judgment is
not binding precedent, except under
the doctrines of law of the case, res
judicata, and collateral estoppel. The
court generally disfavors the citation
of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be
cited under the terms and conditions
of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
DAVID M. EBEL, Circuit Judge.
**1 Defendant-Appellant Ira Lee Wilkins
appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress his confessions that he
claims were given involuntarily and in Eolation of his Fifth Amendment rights Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
AFFIRM.

BACKGROUND
In early 2004, the United States Postal Inspection Service launched an investigation

into the tampering of a credit card account
by a person later identified as Drukyel
Gaines. Gaines changed the account information to indicate that the cardholder wras a
Lorenzo Gray of Tulsa, Oklahoma. Shortly
after these changes were made, a person
purporting to be Lorenzo Gray requested a
duplicate card be issued and mailed to his
address in Tulsa. This card was used to
make over $13,000 worth of purchases; additional cash advances in excess of $5,800
were attempted but denied.
When first interviewed by Postal Inspector
Scott West, Gaines claimed that Lorenzo
Gray was her boyfriend. She further stated
that Gray was the person in a surveillance
photograph taken of a black man wearing
large diamond earrings and an 4OU Sooners" baseball-st\le cap and using the
Lorenzo Gray credit card. West later went to
Gaines' residence to obtain a positive identification of Gray based on the photograph.
When he arrived, Wilkins answered the
door. West thought that Wilkins looked like
the man in the photograph and noticed that
Wilkins was wearing earrings that appeared
to be identical to the ones worn in the photograph. West told Wilkins that he thought
the picture was of him; Wilkins maintained
it was a picture of Lorenzo Gray.
On April 21, 2004. West (along with another
postal inspector) went to Gaines' residence
with a warrant for her arrest. After placing
Gaines in custody, West discovered* 143
Wilkins in the back bedroom. He also found
an uOU Sooners" baseball cap that matched
the hat in the surveillance photograph. The
inspectors then took Wilkins back to the
back bedroom, and questioned him about his
involvement in the credit card scheme. The
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parties dispute whether Wilkins was orally
read and whether he orally waived his
Miranda rights; !KJ both parties acknowledge
Wilkins did not sign a written waiver. Wilkins eventually confessed, verbally and in
writing, that he was the person in the surveillance photos and that he had used the
credit card.
FN1. At the suppression hearing,
West testified that Wilkins was read
his Miranda rights, that Wilkins acknowledged that he understood his
rights, and that Wilkins nevertheless
stated he would talk to the inspectors. On the other hand, Wilkins testified that he was "absolutely not"
read his Miranda rights.
Wilkins was indicted for conspiracy and access device fraud. He moved to suppress any
statements obtained during the April 21 interrogation on the grounds that he was not
properly given his Miranda warnings. After
a hearing, the district court denied the motion, finding that Miranda warnings were in
fact given. The district court also noted that
Wilkins might have been insinuating that
there was some coercion involved in obtaining his confession, but declined to rule on
that issue. Wilkins then pleaded guilty to
conspiracy and was sentenced to nine
months in prison.

may not thereafter raise independent claims
relating to the deprivation of constitutional
rights that occurred prior to the entry of the
guilty plea." United States v. Salazar, 323
F.3d 852, 856 (10th Cir.2003) (quoting
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258. 267, 93
S.Ct. 1602. 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973)). Because Wilkins' confessions occurred prior to
his plea, he may not now argue that those
confessions were taken unconstitutionally.
Therefore, we must AFFIRM the district
court's judgment.
FN2. The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure allow a defendant to enter
a "conditional" guilty plea, "reserving in writing the right to have an
appellate court review an adverse determination of a specified pretrial
motion." Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2). No
such written document appears in the
record, nor does the district court's
docket sheet indicate the entry of a
written, conditional plea.
C.A.IO (Okla.).2005.
U.S. v. Wilkins
158 Fed.Appx. 141, 2005 WL 3388564
(C.A.IO (Okla.))
END OF DOCUMENT

DISCUSSION
On appeal, Wilkins raises various arguments
challenging the district court's denial of his
motion to suppress his confessions. However, the record reflects that Wilkins entered
an unconditional plea of guilty.— When a
defendant voluntarily enters such a plea, "he
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